audiobook With a Sword in One Hand and Jomini in the Other: The Problem of Military Thought in the Civil War North (The Steven and Janice Brose Lectures in the Civil War Era) by Carol Reardon in History

Review

0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Some good research; but light weight material.By David KellyI picked this because the subject of American military professionalism and the problems in growth of the American Defense System has been a pet rock for a long time. Just what this book is as a contribution to that study I find had to place. The overarching thesis is summarized as discourse on; " the problem of military thought in the civil war North". The three chapters are a melding of coincidentally presentation pieces relating to; 1. What professional writings existed in the period. 2. Views on Leadership in the period. 3. Views on warfare and the psychology of war.As an historian the author digs and addresses the personalities and concepts prior to and evolving in Northern conciousness during the war. Interpretation of the meaning and effect of the various inputs fails to yeild any perceptable chosen path. The same can be said of the so called narural genius versus professional schooling and development of soldiers. A chicken and egg debate in which higher formal education practices appeared to win out as a better bet than simply hoping that napoleons will spring out of a coffee can as needed. The last chapter on psychologically responsible; sensitive; touchy feely awareness of the trauma of sustained war seems to more an upchuck of left leaning sniffles than a reality check. ( Does the Taliban get compassionate leave and rotations? )Don't misunderstand me. The book gives some interesting background material and a feeling for the acrimonious debates and self promoting BS that passes itself off as wisdom when a void needs filling. But none of whats in this book sees fit to competently address causalities or solutions or startegic actualities of how Civil War commands solved command and control; logistical; personnel; and policy problems. And in too many cases in reading this I found discriptions of issues poorly defined or just flat out ill informed on the military problems.Case in point was the discussion of troop moral and claims that organizational changes made in the end phase of the war hurt troop moral and caused a problem better left alone. The average volunteer soldier lived in a military world whose horizon scarcely rose above the regimental level. In the furious buildup of the first 18 months of the war officers came and went on promotions so fast that bonding was too often impossible. Some Brigades and a few divisions did evolve personalities through combat excellence or ethnic pride. A huge change accidentally happened when Joe Hooker tasked his Chief of Staff to come up with a command and control tool to identify and rally commands to prevent a repeat of the chaos of Fredericksburg. Dan Butterfield; in a moment of genius invented a scheme of symbols for each corps with a color code for each division and brigade; Butterfield intoduced heraldry to the US Army. This token effort for the Army of the Potomac would within a year be made army wide law.For reasons too complicated to explain here Northern manpower management decisons had totally and consistently failed to keep the Army in the field supplied with replacements. The Union Army went into the critical year of 1864 scarcely ready for the mandates of a war of annihilation it was setting out to execute. General Meade of the Army of the Potomac had faced a situation where his command had never fully recovered since Gettysburg. Too many combat brigades were at 1/3d strength. Reorganiztion had to be done before his army went into combat. Veteran Corps were disbanded and their divisions were reassigned. This action hurt feelings of pride; honor and identification. As a acknowledgement of sympathy old commands were allowed to continue to wear their old Corps badges instead of converting.That's one case in many.Three stars. Interesting but flyweight stuff.2 of 5 people found the following review helpful. Interesting argument--but leaves one wanting moreBy Steven PetersonHenri Jomini was author of a text deemed a significant work on the art of war. Many have looked to him over time as providing key maxims that can lead a general and his army to victory (e.g.; work on the interior lines--something that Robert E. Lee ignored at his peril at the battle of Gettysburg). This book is based on several lectures by the author; a Penn State faculty member.This book explores how Northerners looked at tactics and strategy and tried to make sense of matters. Some emphasized Jomini's work and argued that Union forces ought to adopt these as an approach to the war against the Confederacy. Others felt that other approaches were better--such as the "genius" of leaders. That is; we would have been better off looking for those with mastery of the battlefield; separate from Jomini's perspective. A "great man" theory; in a sense. The book also considers what was often not understood--the human side of war. The Overland Campaign by Grant; culminating in the bloodbath at Cold Harbor provides a case study of the effects of combat on the individual soldier. There is also discussion of organizational factors that could have a role (e.g.; unit integrity--from corps to regiment).One thing that is missing is a more detailed analysis of actual combat; in terms of the extent to which Jomini was or was not relevant. This is not the primary intent of the author; of course; but an application along these lines would have been helpful.This is a useful volume; in terms of exploring how people at the time were looking for a handle on which to make sense of the confusion of the developing war. However; the volume is quite brief and application of perspectives to actual combat in some detail might have been worthwhile. At the close; the author makes a good faith effort to pull things together; and is fairly successful.15 of 19 people found the following review helpful. ExcellentBy David W. NicholasMany years ago I was stranded one afternoon in downtown Los Angeles; near Union Station. It's not hard to get from there to the core of downtown; and so I went to the main library and spent the afternoon there. They had; on their shelves; the Gary Gallagher essay collections on the Battle of Gettysburg (there's one book for each day of the battle). I checked out the first book; and enjoyed it; and from there I wound up getting all 3 books; and have remained a fan of Gallagher and his essay collections ever since. The last of the 3 books had; as its concluding essay; a piece by a woman I'd never heard of before named Carol Reardon. It dealt with the memory of Pickett's Charge; what people thought of the event in postbellum America; on both sides. This is the sort of thing that often fascinates me; how people's perceptions can change the way history is written; when people see what they want to see; and miss the inconvenient stuff. So I was hooked; and when several years later she expanded the essay into a complete book; I bought it. It's one of my favorite books on the Civil War in general; and Gettysburg specifically.So; since I reviewed that book; was kind enough to inform me she had a new book out. "With a Sword in one Hand and Jomini in the Other" is an outgrowth of a series of lectures she gave a few years ago; dealing with the prewar and wartime education of Union Army officers. The quote comes from a Marine Corps colonel who was writing about Civil War officers and their educations; how they learned to think intellectually about fighting and commanding troops. Reardon only partially buys that; doing in the first of her three chapters a pretty thorough overview of the pre-war literature available to American readers of military science. Jomini was probably the most prominent writer; but there were a bunch of others. She also points out something that I didn't know prior to; that there's at least one spot in Jomini's major book "Summary of the Art of War" where Jomini is pretty obviously referring to Clausewitz. It's generally thought that Clausewitz (whose "On War" was published in German in the 1830s) was unknown to American audiences; because he wasn't translated into English until the early 20th century. I think this is interesting; and wonder if any of the American readers got the reference; doubting that they did.Anyway; Reardon's book is very good; and very succinct. She spends most of her time discussing the development of intellectual thought and discipline in the Army before; during; and (in an epilogue) after the Civil War; and it's frankly fascinating. The third chapter of the book discusses Grant's Overland Campaign in 1864; explaining that all of the major psychological stressors that acted upon the soldiers during this campaign were essentially ignored by Jomini; who dealt mostly with what he considered the "science" of warfare. Human factors weren't important. She also explains that when Ardant du Picq came into prominence; it was more or less because he wasn't Jomini; in fact he was rather a polar opposite. Du Picq; of course; advocated for the importance of elan as an antidote to modern firepower and technology. His ideas have largely been dismissed in the years since World War I.As you can tell; I really enjoy this sort of book; and this is a very good example of this sort of writing. Very thoughtful and very interesting. It's probably only for specialists; but they should enjoy debating the book's points; whether they agree with all of them or not.