This book chronicles the political-military development of the Korean Peninsula since 1945; with particular attention to North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear technology and nuclear weapons; and how it has shaped Northeast Asian security and non-proliferation policy and influenced the strategic choices of the United States and all regional powers. I focus on North Korea’s leaders; institutions; political history; and the system’s longer-term prospects. How has an isolated; highly idiosyncratic; small state repeatedly stymied or circumvented the policy preferences of much more powerful states; culminating with its withdrawal from the Non Proliferation Treaty (the only state ever to do so) and the testing of nuclear weapons in open defiance of adversaries and allies alike? What does this portend for the region’s future? Unlike most of the literature that focuses on US non proliferation policy; this is a book about decision making in North Korea and the state’s survival in the face of daunting odds. It draws on extensive interviews with individuals in China; South Korea; Japan; Russia; and the EU who have had ample experience in and with North Korea; additional interviews with former US policy makers; and the results from two visits to the North. The author makes extensive use of archival materials from the Cold War International History Project; enabling a far fuller rendering of North Korean history than appears in most of the literature on the North Korean nuclear weapons issue.
#1050537 in Books Routledge 2011-12-01 2011-10-21Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.69 x .89 x 6.85l; 1.55 #File Name: 0415594871392 pages
Review
0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Beyond satisfaction...By StanioItem was received in excellent condition... Like new @the lowest price A+++++++8 of 8 people found the following review helpful. Excellent primerBy David C. LeaumontThe intention of this text; according to Dr. Gray's introduction; is to provide a textbook for students of strategy. Gray's theme is to "provide a coherent narrative and analysis of the past two centuries; keyed to the strategic perspectives." He frames this around Clausewitz's concept of continuity and discontinuity in strategic history. In fact; his second chapter serves as a summary of Clausewitz's "On War" to ensure readers have an introductory knowledge of the foundational text of military strategy. (Anti-Clausewitzian readers will be disappointed by the frequent reliance on Clausewitz frequently found in Gray's writing; however; this reviewer remains unconvinced by the anti-Clausewitzian camp's critiques.)Gray extols the difference between conducting war (strategy) and warfare (tactical). For instance; Napoleon was a genius at warfare while lacking in the ability to conduct war. As Gray discusses the different phases of history over the past two hundred years; Gray focuses on war/strategy.The title of war; peace and international relations is accurate; however; the text focuses more on the war and peace aspect while being a little lighter on international relations. This is not a critique; but simply an observation. Gray has a less-than-positive view on air power in this text and bucks the convention that air power stood as a predominant factor in defeating Germany during WWII. While I valued his opinion on this aspect; I did not completely agree.Dr. Gray's writing structures this text in a manner for quick yet meaningful digestion. Each chapter begins with a `Reader's Guide' that provides the reader with a preview of major points. He ends each chapter with a review of major take-aways. The book includes several maps at appropriate locations throughout the book rather than having them all grouped at the middle or end of the text. I did not find his writing to be "un-smooth" as another reviewer commented. Gray's references tend to be primary texts concerning the topics; and he provides a substantial bibliography from which to read further.Overall; I think this is an excellent text in which to begin a study in strategic history. As military members in the UD tend to have a military history background; many lack the strategic viewpoint. This is the place from which to begin before delving into other texts on strategic thought to ensure there is a firm intellectual foundation.5 of 6 people found the following review helpful. Does mostly what it says on the coverBy wimiamGenuinely a rare text book of use to undergraduates of international security and military history - comprehensive; giving 21 chapters; usefully organized on themes that really matter; mostly historical; but with sufficient analysis along the way to warrant use in a political science class. Starts with a chapter on the themes of the history; which cross international relations theory; although he's not strong on this; and the relationship between politics and war; on which he is strong; mostly because of grounding in Clausewitz. In fact the second chapter is on Clausewitz - it's an excellent brief summary of an important book; although critics of Clausewitz; probably most especially Martin Van Creveld; should have been given their due; as well as other military philosophers beyond Jomini; for balance. Clearly Gray is a Clausewitzian Cold Warrior and that won't change. After this chapter; the book becomes a military history; starting with the French Revolution and these chapters are excellent; because they summarize the history elegantly and pose and answer key questions (like: Why did one side win?). His answers to these self-imposed questions are genuinely analytical and briefly balance a review of some limited literature with a gathering of evidence - it's impressive; although inevitably at times he excludes more recent scholarships or betrays some eccentricity that grates. The chapters proceed chronologically; 2 for WW1; 4 for WW2; 2 for the Cold War; 1 for the post-cold war world; one on post-9/11 terrorism; another on irregular warfare; chapter 19 on geography and war; which is a somewhat old fashioned interest of his but probably warrants a chapter in a book of this scope. His chapter 20 on "war; peace and international order" strays back into international theory; on which he is clearly disinterested and out of his depth; although opinionated - he mentions only realism; lauds it; then asserts key post-war settlements and breakdowns as evidence for realism without any fair engagement with the other theories. Chapter 21 attempts to forecast and is similarly biased; erring more to old-fashioned psycho-social theories of human conflict. Probably you shouldn't be looking for international relations theory in this book; just the military history; and it would be a rare offering worthy of a student owning for reference and repeat readings.
