Each year in the Highland Guatemala town of Santiago Momostenango; Maya religious societies; dance teams; and cofradÃas perform the annual cycle of rituals and festivals prescribed by Costumbre (syncretized Maya Christian religion); which serves to renew the cosmic order. In this richly detailed ethnography; Garrett Cook explores how these festivals of Jesucristo and the saints derive from and reenact three major ancient Maya creation myths; thus revealing patterns of continuity between contemporary expressive culture and the myths; rituals; and iconography of the Classic and Postclassic Maya. Drawing on fieldwork conducted in the 1970s and renewed in the 1990s; Cook describes the expressive culture tradition performed in and by the cofradÃas and their dance teams. He listens as dancers and cofrades explain the meaning of service and of the major ritual symbols in the cults of the saints and Jesucristo. Comparing these symbols to iconographic evidence from Palenque and myths from the Popol Vuh; Cook persuasively argues that the expressive culture of Momostenango enacts major Maya creation myths—the transformative sunrise; the representation of the year as the life cycle of anthropomorphized nature; and the erection of an axis mundi. This research documents specific patterns of continuity and discontinuity in the communal expression of Maya religious and cosmogonic themes. Along with other recent research; it demonstrates the survival of a basic Maya pattern—the world-creating vegetative renewal cycle—in the highland Maya cults of the saints and Jesucristo.
#6185438 in Books 2005-02-17Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.75 x 7.25 x .50l; #File Name: 027598622596 pages
Review
0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Like most Osprey books it is long on graphics but ...By William D. PonderLike most Osprey books it is long on graphics but at times short on text. For such small battles (in Napoleonic scale) it would have been nice to have maps showing the battalions/regiments. Also more on the battles and less on the Peninsula campaigns. Which could have been a book by itself; with each of the 'battle' books a snapshot of the campaign. Still worth the price as an introduction to the Peninsula War.11 of 12 people found the following review helpful. Doesn't Quite Connect the DotsBy R. A ForczykAs usual Rene Chartrand has put a good effort into his latest effort; on the campaign that began Arthur Wellesley's (AKA the Duke of Wellington) amazing career in the Iberian Peninsula. There is nothing particularly novel are striking in this account; but it provides an excellent summary of the campaign that began the British intervention in Spain and Portugal. The book is set up a bit differently than other Osprey Campaign series titles because about one-third of the text is used to provide background on the campaign; beginning with the French invasion of Portugal in 1807 and the outbreak of popular rebellions in both Spain and Portugal. As usual; there are sections detailing the opposing commanders; armies and plans. One chapter covers the Battle of Rolica; another the Battle of Vimeiro and a third covers the Sintra Convention. Orders of battle are provided for the 1807 invasion; Rolica and Vimeiro. There are five 2-D maps showing the 1807 invasion; the rebellion in June-July 1808; the punitive expedition to Teixeira in June 1808; the British landing in August 1808 and a strategic map of the peninsula in the fall of 1808. There are three 3-D maps: the Battle of Rolica and two of Vimeiro. In addition; there are three battle scenes depicting British infantry attacking at Rolica; the charge of French grenadiers at Vimeiro and the British cavalry counterattack at Vimeiro. The maps of the Battle of Vimeiro are not small scale enough; which makes it difficult to comprehend the actual details of the French attack and British defense; a small-scale 2-D map should have been used to display opposing battalion dispositions. Although Chartrand does a good job laying out the details of the French defeat; he fails to connect the dots. First; the French commander; Junot; seemed to violate as many principles of war as possible. Mass was not achieved because Junot failed to weight his main effort; he split his army into nearly equal halves and initially attacked 4;700 British troops in 6 battalions with only 4;200 French troops in 4 battalions. Surprise was lost through poor security; which allowed Wellesley to redeploy his troops; resulting in a French attack at no more than 1:1 odds. Junot's flanking maneuver was also detected and defeated. Over-confidence on the French side led to poor pre-battle reconnaissance and Junot was unaware of the British strength and dispositions. Compounding these failures; Junot failed to exploit his superiority in artillery and cavalry; while Wellesley made the most of his few guns and mounted troops. The only principle of war that the British violated was unity of command; which deprived them of pursuit but not victory. The French lost the battle because they violated the fundamentals of mass; surprise and security; not because columns can't beat lines. This "column versus line" argument has been exaggerated into a cult for too many years and ignores the principles of war. If Junot's columns had been properly massed at a point that Wellesley had not expected; the French would have broken the British lines. Chartrand is silent on these issues. Why did Junot's army violate so many principles of war? The answer lies in inexperience; over-confidence and amateurish behavior. It is not brought out in this text; but most of the French units had seen little action before Portugal. Both the French 1/86 and 2/86 battalions had been sent on the disastrous expedition to Santo Domingo in 1802 and saw no action in the 1805-1807 campaigns in Europe. The 3/82nd had been raised from detachments in the West Indies and had only just returned to Europe after years of colonial duty. Of the units involved in the French main attack at Vimeiro; only the 3/32nd had served with la Grande Armée in 1805-1807. Much the same held true for the brigade and battalion-level officers; whom Chartrand does not discuss much. Brigadiers Thomiere and Charlot; who led the main attack; had both served in Italy in 1796-7 but had not commanded troops in the 1805-7 campaigns. Brigadiers Brenier and Solignac; who led the flank attack; also had Italian experience but little else. Junot's Army of Portugal was an ad hoc collection of inexperienced troops and limited-service officers. Of course; Napoleon had intended this force as an army of occupation in a remote corner of Europe; not as a first-line combat force. Thus; Wellesley's first taste of command was against an outnumbered and decidedly second-string French army. Yet if Wellesley had been attacked by troops under Marshal Davout or Lannes from the Grande Armee; the results would probably have been vastly different. The British army itself was still pretty inexperienced at continental maneuver war in 1808 and Napoleon made the mistake of continually sending inadequate; second-rate armies to deal with the British; which only gave the British valuable combat experience as they defeated one French army after another. Thus; Wellesley's great reputation built in the Peninsula was due at least as much to Napoleon's strategic short-sightedness as British tactical skill.0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Well-researched information on the origin of the campaign; opposing forces; commanders; strategy and the decisive battlesBy Stephen P. FordI have been very pleased with and impressed with the quality of Osprey publications. The Campaign series are focused on military campaigns from ancient times through the current era. I have found the books in the Osprey Campaign series to be a great source and frequently the only source for well-researched information on military campaigns especially in the ancient campaigns through early 20th century campaigns.
