How has feminist scholarship changed history? Writing Gender History explores the evolution of historical writing about women and gender from the 1930s until the early twenty-first century. With chapters on the history of Europe; the USA; colonial India and Africa; the discussion moves from women's history to gender history; and then to poststructuralist challenges to that history. This revised edition includes an exciting new chapter looking at recent scholarship on race; gender and sexuality in colonial and transnational history; and on the history of the body. Highly accessibly but also encouraging new debate; this book provides students with a comprehensive understanding of gender history; as well as its possible future.
#3499048 in Books 2003-12-23Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.00 x 1.44 x 6.00l; 2.17 #File Name: 0333311078555 pages
Review
22 of 27 people found the following review helpful. By far the best book on the subjectBy Walt Byars"The Years of Hunger" by Stephen Wheatcroft and R.W. Davies; two of the top historians of the USSR; is far and away the best book on the famine of 1931-33. Simply put; no one has done the archival research these two have; no one has put the pieces in place like these two have. The book is a gripping account; almost like a narrative; of the famine and the Soviet political culture; as well as the mentality of the populace. The early chapters describe the major state programs of collectivisation; dekulakisation; and crop collection. The later chapters examine the nature of the Sovkhozy and Kolkhozy the death of livestock; as well as a concluding chapter rebutting various arguments made by political ideologues about the famine and putting it in historical perspective.The many and varied factors causing the famine are dmonstrated to a high degree. Overall; and quite generally; the famine resulted from bad policy rushed into quickly. However; this isn't the whole story. The famine was as bad as it was because of a whole slew of phenomena that corresponded with the bad policy. Policy limiting the extent of fallow land and mandated overcultivation; for example; severely reduced flexibility of planting times which became disastrous when combined with odd weather conditions. The bungling of grain collections by the state is explored in excruciating; but gripping; detal. Wheatcroft and Davies frequently recount series of communication between officials; or proposed policy documents as they circulate through the heirarchy; describing the conditions and proposing oslutions; and the response of the higher ups. The top leadership comes off looking somewhat bad on net; altohugh there are a number of examples of people like Stalin making the right decision in the face of incompetent subordinates. The caricature of Stalin as tyrant who would allow no criticism is thoroughly demolished. From what I gathered from the book; the authoritarian nature of the political system and restrictions on/intimidation of people who would potentially speak up did not seem to be as big of a problem as it was in some other authoritarian nations with major famines.One problem is their criticism of Mark Tauger's arguments about the role of plant disease that was spreading throughout the area (somewhat independent of state policy). Tauger (correctly) presents this as a small but significant cause; whereas Wheatcroft and Davies would have it be insignificant. However; their argument agianst Tauger is completely incoherent. This should be obvious when one reads it; but you can also find Tauger's review of this book on the Economic History website.Although there are only a few pages dedicated to refuting alternative explanations of the famine; this book serves to utterly destroy right wing (the famine was deliberate) and left wing (it was caused by reactionary saboteurs) myths about the famine. There is no evidence of an intentional famine at all; and the book recounts the serious attempts of the state to help mitigate and eliminate the famine. The authors even quote a personal correspondence with Robert Conquest in which he concedes (contrary to what he got famous for saying for decades) that the famine wasn't intentional. While only a few Ukrainian nationalist cranks hold this view; the book clearly destroys the idea of a famine concentrated only or overwhelmingly in the Ukraine. They show that 5.5-6.5M died in the famine; rather than some higher estimates.While they don't explicitly mention them; this book refutes the favorite claims of certain Stalinists about the famine. To give one example; Douglas Tottle has tried to show the extent of sabotage by giving a few examples of saboteurs killing livestock and attributing the entire decline to sabotage. The chapter in this book on livestock; however; shows that the livestock starved in the famine itself! They also show how the condition they were kept in in state and collective farms contributed to the deaths of livestock.6 of 9 people found the following review helpful. Fine study of the famine yearsBy William PodmoreIn this remarkable book; Davies and Wheatcroft describe and analyse the dreadful famine in the Soviet Union in 1931-33.They show that 1931 saw an unusually cold spring; delaying the sowing; and unusually hot weather in May; June and July; bringing a drought and cutting grain yields. 1932's March was even colder than 1931's; May and June even hotter.They note that in February 1933 "the Politburo authorised the issue of over 800;000 tons of grain as seed to North Caucasus; Ukraine; the Lower-Volga Region; Urals and Kazakhstan; and a further 400;000 tons was issued before the end of the spring sowing. ... Between February and July no fewer than thirty-five Politburo decisions and Sovnarkom decrees - all secret or top-secret - authorised in total the issue of 320;000 tons of grain for food." This included 194;000 tons of food aid for Ukraine. A total of `nearly 2 million tons' was issued for seed; food and fodder.Davies and Wheatcroft provide detailed data on the state's seed; food and fodder loans and aid between February and July 1933 in their Tables 22; 23 and 24. They also show that "Considerable efforts were made to supply grain to hungry children."They conclude that Robert Conquest was wrong to assert that Stalin `wanted a famine'; that `the Soviets did not want the famine to be coped with successfully' and that the Ukrainian famine was `deliberately inflicted for its own sake'. Their book refutes the big lie that the famine was a holocaust of the people of Ukraine.
