Wedged chronologically between World War II and Vietnam; the Korean War—which began with North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in June of 1950—possessed neither the virtuous triumphalism of the former nor the tragic pathos of the latter. Most Americans supported defending South Korea; but there was considerable controversy during the war as to the best means to do so—and the question was at least as exasperating for American army officers as it was for the general public. A longtime historian of American military leadership in the crucible of war; Stephen R. Taaffe takes a close critical look at how the highest ranking field commanders of the Eighth Army acquitted themselves in the first; decisive year in Korea. Because an army is no better than its leadership; his analysis opens a new perspective on the army's performance in Korea; and on the conduct of the war itself.In that first year; the Eighth Army’s leadership ran the gamut from impressive to lackluster—a surprising unevenness since so many of the high-ranking officers had been battle-tested in World War II. Taaffe attributes these leadership difficulties to the army’s woefully unprepared state at the war’s start; army personnel policies; and General Douglas MacArthur’s corrosive habit of manipulating his subordinates and pitting them against each other. He explores the personalities at play; their pre-war experiences; the manner of their selection; their accomplishments and failures; and; of course; their individual relationships with each other and MacArthur. By explaining who these field; corps; and division commanders were; Taaffe exposes the army’s institutional and organizational problems that contributed to its up-and-down fortunes in Korea in 1950–1951. Providing a better understanding of MacArthur’s controversial generalship; Taaffe’s book offers new and invaluable insight into the army’s life-and-death struggle in America’s least understood conflict.
#175105 in Books University Press of Kansas 2010-04-27Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.20 x 2.00 x 6.40l; 2.50 #File Name: 0700617094664 pages
Review
14 of 15 people found the following review helpful. It's all about contextBy Bryan GibbyA subordinate of the Duke of Wellington at Waterloo is supposed to have said of Napoleon that "he moves his cannon with the likeness of a pistol." Allan Millett with similiar agility and deftness maneuvers from the tactics and battlefield engagements of this internationalized Korean War to the strategic and policy debates that raged more or less continuously in Moscow; Beijing; Washington; (and to a lesser extent in coverage) in Seoul and Pyongyang. Dr. Millett has been immersed in the Korean War for over twenty years and it shows with his command of every conceivable source -- memoirs; operational reports; political reports and cables; letters and journals; official studies and books; and a vast secondary literature in Korean; Chinese; Russian; and English. The writing style is crisp; engaging; at times humorous; but always incisive in detail and analysis.Dr. Millett's greatest contribution perhaps is to lay out the full context of the War. In this second of three volumes; the "what" is always accompanied and explained by the "how" and "why." The focus of this volume is the internationalized war beginning with the North Korean invasion in June 1950 and terminating with the initial tentative feelers for a negotiated settlement a year later. The intervention of foreign powers (North Korean; United Nations/United States; and the People's Republic of China) in the southern civil war is fully assessed with a comprehensive analysis of the military impact and the delicate political maneuvering that all parties had to manage. The deliberations of the Truman administration ought not to occasion much surprise; more notable perhaps is the policy wrangling on the Communist side. Millett shows clearly how decisions made and not made in the various capitals affected the strategy and conduct of the shooting war. (Students of U.S. Cold War policy and history will be pleased with the detailed narrative of American defense policy and the debates; painstakingly reconstructed from primary sources; surrounding rearmament and military intervention.)The analysis of campaigns and battles is first rate and thorough. Some aspects that most histories remain obscure on but are clearly illuminated here are: the competence and preparadness of the Korean People's Army (less than presumed); the fighting ability and spirit of the ROK Army (greater than usually acknowledged); the tactical and operational handicaps of the U.S. Eighth Army; the personalities that affected tactical and strategic choices; the difficulties and real accomplishments of the Chinese People's Volunteer Force; Stalin's conundrum and his resolution to fight to the last Chinese.A cliche in the business is that the Korean War is "the forgotten war." This label is not true as there are dozens of Korean War histories. However; it is true that the war is generally misunderstood -- then and now. Too much effort has traditionally devolved on the American-Chinese confrontation; which has skewed many interpretations of the conflict. Millett brings us back to the reality that this was a Korean conflict (it was their war first). Intervention ensured that a general status quo would prevail. How that status quo would be settled; and whether (and how) it could be maintained is only hinted at in this volume; but will be the central question of volume three; covering the years 1951-1953.0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. This book is for the serious student of the Korean ...By David J. MooreThis book is for the serious student of the Korean War and it covers a mostly neglected element of the war; That is; the vigorous prosecution of the war by the South Koreans after initial setbacks;1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. ... and this is one of the most informative and best documented books I have readBy Jerri GarofaloI am researching a lesser known but major battle during the Korean War and this is one of the most informative and best documented books I have read; and I have read many. Mr Millett does not fall for some of the frequently told falsehoods; but tells it like it really was.
