From slave ships to plantations to freedom; The Struggle Against Slavery traces the remarkable history of the heroic fight to end slavery; from its North American beginnings in the early 1600s to its violent demise in the mid-1800s with the Civil War. Captured in their own words from transcripts; diaries; memoirs; newspaper clippings; drawings; and other documents are the stories of how slaves and free blacks fought against the dehumanization of slavery by developing anti-racist arguments; creating their own institutions; physically escaping; and fighting with weapons. An exceptional social; political; and cultural history of the period; The Struggle Against Slavery is filled with stirring tales of survival and strength; bringing to life the African-American experience in early America.
#2080482 in Books William W Freehling 1994-05-12Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 6.10 x .80 x 9.10l; 1.09 #File Name: 0195088085336 pagesThe Reintegration of American History Slavery and the Civil War
Review
11 of 13 people found the following review helpful. The Way of the Lash: Slavocracy in Thought and ActionBy Omer BelskyWilliam W. Freehling calls for a new; 'reintegrated' American history; merging social; political and military history; in his fascinating essay collection; which follows the evolution of the Slavocratic South in roughly chronological order: the second essay deals with the Founding Fathers' attitudes towards slavery; while the later ones map Southern history to Appomattox. The main thread through Freehling's essays is the conflict he sees between two incompatible Southern ideologies: Paternalism - the view that a Southern Slavocracy has to guide not only black slaves and white women; but also 'lesser' white men; and what he calls Herrenvolkism; or white supremacy - the notion; associated with Andrew Jackson; that America is the republic of equal white men. Most exciting is Freehling's description of a tendency - one may almost say conspiracy - by Southern Paternalists to undermine the main instrument of the Herrenvolk ideology; the Jacksonian Democratic party; and replace it with a solid; Paternalistic; anti-antislavery South. The prime suspect is Secretary of State Abel P. Upshur; who commenced the struggle for the annexation of Texas as a way to awaken Southern consciousness: "There is [a] systematic conspiracy against the South and its institution..." Upshur wrote "[t]he South will be deceived... and will wake up; only to find itself powerless". Upshur saw the danger in "Northern Politicians... ever ready to sacrifice both political and moral principle" (quoted on pp. 126-128). Abel Upshur considered Herrenvolk democracy untrustworthy because not all Southerners had slave property and thus a stake in the system. Instead; they could be deluded by Jacksonian demagogues. (pp. 130-131). The Texas annexation issue was thus; at least partially; a measure against the Democratic Party.Possibly because Freehling's research covers such long periods; he downplays the role of contingencies. In his discussion of the causes of Southern defeat in the Civil War; Freehling criticizes historians such as James McPherson; who believe that the outcome of the Civil War was dependent upon battlefield victories. "[M]ilitary narrators [argue]... military outcomes shaped social outcomes; not vice versa; and military outcomes might easily have been reversed". Freehling convincingly argues that regardless of the outcome of Antietam; British pro Southern Military intervention was unlikely; and that even had George McClellan won the 8164 presidential elections; the war for the Union would have continued (pp. 224-228). Freehling locates social causes for Southern defeat: the defection of upper South whites and of blacks to the North.Here Freehling fails to differentiate between the circumstances of the war and the causes for the defeat. In the 1850s; the sectional conflict was between Southerners and Northerners - but in the 1860s; the American Civil War raged between the eleven states of the Confederacy and the rest of the United States. Did Southerners lose the war before they began to fight it because of their political failure to win the allegiance of the Boarder South?Possibly; but Freehling should prove it. When the war broke; the Confederates had several advantages: 2 million square kilometers of territory that the North had to conquer; some of the best soldiers in the United States; experienced leadership; and most important; it had to merely defend itself in an age of war technology advantageous to the defense. Certainly; the task was onerous; but Freehling hardly considers the failure to devise means corresponding to the ends: the failure of strategy.Unlike the Northern 'Anaconda Plan'; which was tailored to the North's strengths and the South's weaknesses; the South's strategy; as far as there was one; made absolutely no sense - the South spent its precious manpower and best commanders on pointless invasions of the North along the Eastern front; while allowing Grant to defeat them in the West. Had the South chosen a defensive strategy; forcing the North to waste its power against heavy artillery in the bulwarks; the war might have ended very differently. By 1863; the Confederacy might have been doomed - but that was due to defective leadership; not necessarily to the long patterns of Southern history.Similarly; Freehling does not distinguish between the South's reasons to press for strict Fugitive Slave Laws and for largely symbolic victories in Kansas and Nebraska from the reasons for Southern secession in 1860 (p. 143). Historians' consensus on the second question is clear: Southerners left the Union because the Republican Revolution meant that the Union was no longer in Slaveholder's hands; and thus no longer safe for slavery. But why did Southerners; by forcing proslavery measures; undermine the antebellum two party system and thus their control of American politics?Freehling offers an intriguing partial answer: Southerners feared that increasing Fugitives from Boarder states would undermine slavery in the Upper South; and that; as the rates of slavery in the boarder states would decline; 'demagogues' - that is; anti-slavery advocates - would triumph in them; leading to the eventual abolition of slavery throughout the United States. Similarly; the agitation to reopen the slave trade was to solve the dwindling of slavery in the upper South (p.210). Thus the pro-Slavery campaigns were rational; if miscalculated; reactions to the social disunity of the South.This is part of Freehling's campaign for a 'reintegrated' American History - "the whole socio/political/military history flow[ing] in one piece" (p. 274). I find two flaws in Freehling's approach: it underemphasizes Economics; and it lacks systematic quantification.Viewing slavery as an economic system offers two alternative explanations for the phenomena he described: that the higher productivity of slavery in the tropical lower South; not fugitive slaves and anti-slavery propaganda; caused the dwindling of slavery in the boarder regions; and that similarly; the booming lower South economy of the 1850s; and the shortage of slaves; were the roots of the agitation for reopening the slave trade.The solution to both questions can not come from general sociology; from reading the mind of Southerners; or from political history. The only way to answer these questions is a systematic quantitative approach. As Colin McEvedy wrote: "History being a branch of the biological sciences; its ultimate expression must be mathematical."1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. wowBy A Customerif you're interested in civil war causation and the ante-bellum south; GET THIS BOOK! i've studied the civil war-era for a while now and every single essay taught me something new. I LOVE THIS FREAKING BOOK! thanks; mr. freehling.0 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Fast shipping and a well-conditioned book!By Pamela NorvaYou really lived up to the expectation of shipping it fast. The book is in a very good condition as well. Thank you!
