This book brings to light Russia's undeservedly-obscure military past; rectifying the tendency of American and Western military historians to neglect the Russian side of things. Russia; as both a Western and non-Western society; challenges our thinking about Western military superiority. Russia has always struggled with backwardness in comparison with more developed powers; at some times more successfully than others. The imperatives of survival in a competitive international environment have; moreover; produced in Russian society a high degree of militarization. While including operational and tactical detail that appeals to military history enthusiasts; this book simultaneously integrates military history into the broader themes of Russian history and draws comparisons to developments in Europe. The book also challenges old assumptions about the Russian military. Russian military history cannot be summed up simply in a single stock phrase; whether perennial incompetence or success only through stolid; stoic defense; it also shows numerous examples of striking offensive successes.Stone traces Russia's fascinating military history; and its long struggle to master Western military technology without Western social and political institutions. It covers the military dimensions of the emergence of Muscovy; the disastrous reign of Ivan the Terrible; and the subsequent creation of the new Romanov dynasty. It deals with Russia's emergence as a great power under Peter the Great and culminating in the defeat of Napoleon. After that triumph; the book argues; Russia's social and economic stagnation undermined its enormous military power and brought catastrophic defeat in the Crimean War. The book then covers imperial Russia's long struggle to reform its military machine; with mixed results in the Russo-Japanese War and World War I. The Russian Revolution created a new Soviet Russia; but this book shows the continuity across that divide. The Soviet Union's interwar innovations and its harrowing experience in World War II owed much to imperial Russian precedents. A superpower after the war; the Soviet Union's military might was purchased at the expense of continuing economic backwardness. Paradoxically; the very militarization intended to provide security instead destroyed the Soviet Union; leaving a new Russia behind the West economically. Just as there was a great deal of continuity after 1917; this book demonstrates how the new Russian military has inherited many of its current problems from its Soviet predecessor. The price that Russia has paid for its continued existence as a great power; therefore; is the overwhelming militarization of its society and economy; a situation it continues to struggle with.
#1419196 in Books 1988-11-17Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 8.50 x .63 x 5.51l; 1.06 #File Name: 0275929361259 pages
Review
8 of 9 people found the following review helpful. An intellectual military tradition.By Stone DogThis book highlights the dawn of the intellectual military tradition in Prussia that created an officer corps that *thought* and focused upon the result to be obtained rather than simply following processes.Gerhard Von Scharnhorst emerges after Prussia's disasterous loss to Napolean to spark a new way in which officers; down to the lowest rank; are to approach their profession. He began with the "military society" wherin officers thought about war as a science rather than an art. Officers were responsible for their own intellectual development. They wrote papers; debated; explored and challenged each other. Von Scharnhorst led the deveopment of a military that consistently out-thought their opponents because they didn't simply follow orders. Officers; at every level; were focused upon the result to be obtained - even if this required *disobeying* orders from above in favor of what the situation in front of them required.This doesn't mean that everyone acted on his own; but rather fulfilled the commander's *intent* by doing what is actually needed to produce a result that will facilitate the higher commander's desired result. They saw war as a creative act which required an intellectual framework and trust both down to a subordinate and upwards to the higher commander. As a result; they were consistently able to make decisions faster that their opponents.This not the story of battles and campaigns. Rather; it is the story of reforming a system that no longer produced the desired result. It is the story of men who think about their profession and where disagreement and strenuous debate are not only tolerated; but encouraged. Compare that with the intellectual environment in the US Army between the world wars that threatened the careers of young Dwight Eisenhower and George Patton for simply *writing* about new technologies (such as the armored vehicle) and how they might challenge existing tactics and traditional combat arms.This book should be read by every American military professional from lowest rank to highest as well as our political leaders. I heartily recommend this book to all interested in military science.0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. An excellent introductionBy zrothA must-read for anyone looking to understand proper military organization and how we could institute it in the US. Highly recommend.11 of 13 people found the following review helpful. The ReformersBy Kevin F. KileyScharnhorst; the Hanoverian officer who transferred to the Prussian service; bringing with him new ideas of professionalism; excellence; and the education of officers; was one of the guiding lights in Prussia after their catastrophic defeat by Napoleon and his terrible Grande Armee; that; in three weeks of marching; fighting; and pursuit; destroyed the old Prussian Army of Frederick the Great.This excellent volume; however; is not of the reform period; nor does it chronicle the decisive campaign of 1806. What it does tell us; is of Scharnhorst's efforts to institutionalize excellence in the Prussian army; especially its officer corps; and to move it into the era of modern warfare as exemplified by Napoleon and the French experience in the Wars of the Revolution.Scharnhorst; as a new lieutenant colonel with a new patent of nobility; launched into the old ideas of Prussia's methods of waging war; and gathered about him like-minded souls that saw the shortcomings of the Prussian system and wanted to improve the army; especially the officer corps that was dominated by Junkers; the landed Prussian aristocracy that thought it their right to provide the army with its officer corps. To that end; Scarnhorst established the Militarische Gesellschaft; or Military Society; in Berlin. While not a school; it did become a think tank; and most of its members went on to become members of the revamped and reorganized Prussian General Staff; which was attempting to come into the modern world of the nineteenth century; based on the French staff example.Before 1806 there was only partial success; Scharnhorst meeting opposition from most of the older generals and many of his peers. Still; there was success. Many papers and studies were published; including a noteworthy one by Scharnhorst on the Marengo Campaign of 1800; which noted the reforms in organization; tactics; leadership; and staff functioning that were being employed by the French. It also noted the numerous shortcomings of the Austrian Army.This is a valuable work for any understanding of what the Prussian Army; or rather; certain of its members; were trying to do in the rough days before 1806; and in the even rougher ones after. Based on much primary German sources; including Scharnhorst's personal papers; it is a necessary work for both the study and understanding of the period; and it places the nucleus of the responsibility for the Prussian reforms squarely on Scharnhorst's shoulder; where they evidently belong. This is a necessary work for any student of the period and is very highly recommended.
