In these pages; acclaimed historian Flora Fraser unfurls the story of George and Martha; brilliantly narrating the lives of an extraordinarily dedicated; accomplished; and historic couple. When they married in colonial Virginia in 1759; he was an awkward but ambitious young officer; she; a graceful; wealthy young widow. They were devoted to one another; and George was as a father to Martha’s children by her first husband. She endowed Washington with the confidence—and resources—that would aid him when elected commander-in-chief of the Continental army. During the war; Martha resolutely supported her husband; ‘the General;’ joining him every winter in headquarters; she was essential to his well-being and was a redoubtable; vastly admired figure. After the American victory; George was elected our first president and Martha became an impeccable first First Lady. During his presidency; the two established the tenets and traditions of our highest office. This is the story of a pioneering partnership—and an enthralling narrative of our nation’s emergence onto the world stage.
#127069 in Books Michael R Gordon 2013-03-12 2013-03-12Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.20 x 1.60 x 6.10l; 2.21 #File Name: 0307388948832 pagesThe Endgame The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq from George W Bush to Barack Obama
Review
5 of 5 people found the following review helpful. Behind the scenes look at post-invasion IraqBy J. SoubraMy personal recollection of post-invasion Iraq consisted of an impressionistic patchwork of news reports on bombings; IED and suicide attacks; political debates; and opinion pieces. I didn't feel that I had a very coherent understanding of how we really got from point A to B in Iraq. I think most military history enthusiasts understand that there is some period of time required for the dust to sufficiently settle from historic events to allow the conscientious historian to assemble the facts (and opinions) behind something as chaotic as war and present a more pragmatic version of events. This book provided exactly what I look for in a historical record; with an incredible amount of behind-the-scenes information from interviews of the key players and declassified (and classified?) documentation; enabling me to form that coherent vision. I noticed some reviews criticize the book because they disagree with the authors' opinions expressed throughout the book. Personally; I don't care if the authors express their opinion as it is done here; in a non-heavy handed way and without disrupting the narrative. The key to this book is that the reporting of the history gives you sufficient; factual information to enable the reader to feel confident in forming his own opinion of events and actions; and contrast it to the authors. If you can't accept a book where the author's opinion differs from your own; just go to a book store and read the Epilogue which summarizes the authors' thoughts on the management of post-invasion Iraq and you might save a few bucks.1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. The End Game…and Beginning and Middle TooBy H. P.“Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war; and you are to help them; not win it for them.†--T.E. LawrenceTitle notwithstanding; The End Game starts from the beginning. The early stuff has been covered elsewhere before; but is appreciated nonetheless. In particular; The End Game is focused on the colonels and generals; rather than; as most of the books on the subject I’ve read; the highest military brass and civilian leadership.We get the disaster of Bremer (he basically scuttled the entire Iraqi infrastructure; but never seriously invested in replacing it). In fact; the entire early war effort is a tragedy of errors. Casey was another disaster. He completely focused on a drawdown; when more and more evidence was pointing to its futility and the potential of counterinsurgency (a counterinsurgency strategy (under the guise of an “ink blot†strategy) was put forward as many as 16 months before the surge). Gordon and Trainor make a convincing case that our strategy was a failure even before Samarra blew the powder keg.We faced two serious problems. Suuni insurgent attacks led to Shiite Iraqis terrorizing Sunni Iraqis; often using the arm of the state. That opened the door for Al Qaeda to wage war directly against the Americans in Iraq.It’s always been fascinating to the see the slow progress from virtually full support for a drawdown to the conclusion that the full surge; not simply a small increase. Petraeus had been pushing counterinsurgency; but it was viewed with great skepticism by his superiors. President Bush may have boldly accepted a large surge; but it was the generals on the ground who set the strategy for how the additional battalions would be used.The Sunni Awakening was one of the great surprises of the Iraq War. For all the arguments for the Surge; the effect of the Surge on the Awakening was not fully appreciated. The Awakening may have preceded the Surge; but the counterinsurgency tactics of the Surge took the Awakening out of Anbar. The Awakening started as “a bottom-up phenomenon driven by local Iraqis and the American units they encountered in the field. It was not something the generals . . . had organized from on high.†But recognized and appreciated; they were complementary and fed off each other.Sadly; this isn’t a story with a happy ending. We see the political tail wagging the policy dog in an administration dominated by former Senators. Both militaries wanted a continued US military presence; but the politics for the politicians were much trickier on both sides. It was a fundamental error by both the Bush and Obama administrations to allow the Office of the Vice President greater influence than the State Department. The Office of the VP can never bring the kind of resources and infrastructure to bear that the State Department can. Despite the success of the surge; feckless decision making is leaving us back where we started before the surge. But then; I question whether; whatever the military success of the surge; we ever did the other things necessary to “win.â€This review is of the Kindle edition. Just over 20% of the Kindle edition is devoted to reference material; etc.; including acknowledgments; notes (hyperlinked both ways; and taking up 12% of the Kindle edition itself); index (hyperlinked); short bios of the authors; illustrations; maps and charts; and an ‘also by.’1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Comprehensive and AccurateBy Frank G.Gordon and Trainor's book is the best study - to date - of the military and political aspects of the war in Iraq. It is more than a standard history of military and diplomatic activities. It provides details of non-public meetings and decisions not only in coalition military headquarters throughout Iraq but also in the Presidential Palace in Baghdad's Green Zone and in the White House. And these details provide new and valuable insights into the successes and failures of the U.S. in Iraq from 2003 through 2012. Are the details accurate? I spent a year in Iraq and was present for a few of the meetings discussed in this book. To be clear; I wasn't sitting at the table - I was one of the persons sitting in a folding chair against the wall. In my opinion; the Gordon and Trainor version of these meetings is entirely accurate which increases my confidence that their other descriptions are accurate as well. If there is one substantial gap in this work; it is the decision to downplay the dramatic changes in the Iraqi economy during this period e.g. the political impact of the 2006 collapse in Iraqi government revenue. However; there are other recent works on the post-2003 Iraqi economy; so anyone interested can obtain an economic perspective on this period. Overall; I think that the greatest value of Gordon and Trainor's work is not as history but rather as a source of lessons learned - and maybe an exhortation to humility - for future U.S. military/diplomatic efforts in the Middle East.
