audiobook The Caucasus and the Oil; The German-Soviet War in the Caucasus 1942/43 by Wilhelm Tieke in History

Review

7 of 7 people found the following review helpful. Badly-written but curiously compelling story of Germany's crazy Caucasus campaignBy David LjunggrenRight at the start I should say that unless you have a huge interest in Operation Edelweiss; Germany's bid to gain control of the Caucasus and capture the oil fields of Baku; this book will frustrate you. It is a hugely detailed account of the fighting which started when the Germans pushed south out of Rostov in the summer of 1942. It is also badly-written; or; I should say; barely written at all in places; with narrative interspersed with reminiscences and battle orders and extracts from battle diaries. The maps are hand-drawn; too small; and are full of names transliterated into German; which makes them tough to find. The book (written in 1970 by a German veteran of the campaign and translated more recently) is unabashedly pro-German and rarely cites Soviet works.All that said; if you are (like me) fascinated by this part of the war and willing to put up with the book's flaws and even better; able to look at a detailed map AND Google Earth while reading; this is a compelling work. The idea of taking control of the Caucasus and seizing the Baku oil fields was in theory a good one; since that would have slashed supplies of fuel to the Red Army. Right from the start; though; the plan was undermined by the Nazis' decision to attack Stalingrad at the same time. Hitler split his forces and there were never going to be enough troops to successfully complete Edelweiss; especially when you consider the distances and the fact the Greater Caucasus range is 750 miles long. The battle plan was so hopeless it barely counted as a plan. One Italian mountain division was sent to Stalingrad when it should have been fighting in the Caucasus. The Germans often knew nothing about the terrain and the troops were initially issued maps printed in Tsarist times. The supposed "roads" across the western Caucasus often turned out either not to exist at all; or to be narrow tracks unsuitable even for horses; much less armoured vehicles. The terrain overwhelmingly favoured defenders. The lower foothills were covered in thick; thick forests; which made fighting tough. The under-strength Germans fought in the snows and the valleys and the mountains - they clashed with Soviet troops at 18;000 feet (!) on the slopes of Mount Elbrus - as they tried to push their way through western mountain passes to Black Sea ports in southern Russia and on the Georgian coast. At one point they came agonisingly close; just 15 km or so from Tuapse on the Black Sea; before they ran out of troops. You actually end up feeling kind of sorry for the Germans. The book also recounts how German armoured reconnaissance troops sped east across the deserts of Kalmykia and almost made it to the Caspian Sea. In the south-east; the troops pushed south towards the main road to Baku but ground to a halt on the outskirts of Vladikavkaz. Once the Russians regained their strength in the winter of 1942 there was only ever going to be one way this story ended and the last quarter of the book deals with the Nazi retreat in early 1943.If you want to learn more about the campaign; take a look at this 45-minute English-language documentary[...]4 of 4 people found the following review helpful. Good enough for what it isBy Colin WrightThis is a rather clumsy translation of what doesn't appear to have been an especially inspired original -- however; my expectations weren't all that high to begin with; and there isn't a whole lot else that focuses on the Caucasus campaign; so if this is an interest; the book is a good buy.What 'The Caucasus and the Oil' DOES provide is a catalog of German actions and movements during the campaign. What it does NOT provide is much in the way of a look at 'the other side of the hill;' analysis; or discussion of the perils and possibilities inherent in the campaign. Tieke's work is a useful text; but it's hardly the last word on the subject.1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. A Unique; but Bland Historical NarrativeBy R. A ForczykThe German invasion of the Caucasus is July 1942 is one of those “forgotten campaigns” of the Eastern Front in World War 2 that has received almost no attention in English-language historiography. Currently; the one exception is Wilhelm Tieke’s The Caucasus and the Oil; translated into English in 1995; his original German version was published back in 1970. Tieke (1923-2012) was a German veteran who served in the campaign as an enlisted soldier in the SS-Division Wiking. Tieke was a prolific German-language historian who tried to write in the heroic style of Paul Carrell; but didn’t quite have the knack for it. The Caucasus and the Oil is a decent history of the campaign which extends from the initial German invasion in July 1942 to their final evacuation of the Taman Peninsula in October 1943; but it is primarily from the German point of view and doesn’t go into the kind of detail that Carrell and others have achieved. Instead; the book can be a fairly bland recitation of German units moving hither and yon; with little or no discussion of the reasons why. Although Hitler’s desire to capture the oil fields in the Caucasus is clearly stated; the author rarely refers to high-lever decision-making; such as Generalfeldmarschall List; commander of Army Group A. Consequently; the reader is provided a good summary of combat actions down to battalion-level; but there is little insight or analysis added to explain events. Overall; this is an important book because it is a unique resource; but it reflects a somewhat dated approach and fails to meet basic standards of historical scholarship in a number of regards. The book is divided into 23 short chapters with sub-headings; just like Paul Carrell did; which is good for breaking the book up into digestible components. Each chapter also has B/W sketch maps which are decent for following the action in the given chapter; although the spelling of towns and locations can differ from what is used in the text. Tieke based this book on a series of interview he conducted with German veterans; so the level of detail can vary considerably between chapters. Some first-person accounts included are excellent and really add to the narrative; while others seem kind of flat. However; there are no Soviet accounts included in the narrative other than Marshal Grechko’s propaganda-style memoir and most of the German accounts tend to be from junior-level soldiers and officers; so the perspective is skewed toward tactical level. The author has also included a number of photographs; but there is no index or bibliography. Tieke’s narrative covers the broad canvas of the German invasion fairly well and he tends to emphasize German successes. However; he never really discusses why the Germans – who were after the oil fields – kept getting distracted by other less important objectives; like the port of Tuapse; placing a Nazi flag on Mount Elbruz or attempting to bull their way through various mountain passes. German losses are only mentioned in passing; at best; and there is no information about logistics; even though fuel shortages helped to frustrate the Germans more than the Red Army. Luftwaffe operations are mentioned from time to time; but fail to note bomber raids on the oil fields or the gradual Soviet air superiority. Soviet successes; like their defensive stand on the Terek River; are not explained. German atrocities against civilians are ignored and Tieke’s Waffen SS comrades come off looking pretty good. This is an acceptable history; although its perspective is inherently biased in favor of the Germans and seems to over-look the mistakes that led to them losing this campaign.