“William F. Buckley might disagree; but the former university president is clear on the three most important things in life.†—New York Magazine “Father Hesburgh says that each one of us can do something effective in the cause of a better world. God; Country; Notre Dame itself embodies an obvious refutation of the apathetic notion that ‘in the modern world one person cannot make a difference’.†—Commonweal “The temptation is to subtitle this book; ‘Adventures of Superpriest.’ If Father Hesburgh made it all up; it would still be a wonderful story; a compendium of what-ifs . . . its warmth and humanity are infectious; and most readers will not have the nerve to fight off the pleasure of going along.†—Chicago Tribune FLAP COPY I have traveled far and wide; far beyond the simple parish I envisioned as a young man. My obligation of service has led me into diverse yet interrelated roles: college teacher; theologian; president of a great university; counselor to four popes and six presidents. Excuse the list; but once called to public service; I have held fourteen presidential appointments over the years; dealing with the social issues of our times; including civil rights; peaceful uses of atomic energy; campus unrest; amnesty for Vietnam offenders; Third World development; and immigration reform. But deep beneath it all; wherever I have been; whatever I have done; I have always and everywhere considered myself essentially a priest. —from the Preface
#1141378 in Books 2005-08-19 2005-08-19Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.12 x 1.36 x 6.12l; 1.82 #File Name: 0253345286416 pages
Review
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. An analytical examination of the battle…not for those seeking an action-packed narrativeBy William S. GrassThe Battle of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action (published 2005); is the work of British military historian and author H. P. Willmott. The author points out very early on; in the first few pages; that the Battle of Leyte Gulf; fought in late October; 1944; was a very unusual naval battle. He puts forth five reasons why this was so. He maintains; however; that two of the five were most important: that the battle was fought after the greater issue of victory and defeat in the sea war had already been determined; and that the battle itself resulted in a clear cut victory and defeat.If the already determined victor in the sea war dealt a crushing blow in battle to the already determined loser; as was to be expected; then why is there such an enduring fascination among American readers with this battle? It is because of one particular portion of the greater battle; known as the Action Off Samar; which was the only part of the battle where U.S. forces fought at a disadvantage; albeit for only a few hours. How this came about; due to the high command negligence or recklessness of Admiral Halsey; has been discussed and debated continuously by historians in the decades since WW2. Of greatest importance to most readers has been the action itself: how a small group of tiny escort vessels of the U.S. Navy; acting as a screen for an escort carrier group; fought it out for several hours with heavy Japanese units of battleships and cruisers; and most of them living to tell the tale; when they could very well have been destroyed in their entirety.The Action Off Samar has been showcased and emphasized in the historiography much to the detriment of the other portions of the battle. Willmott points out as well that close examination of the preliminaries of the battle; as well as the aftermath; and factors such as fuel availability that severely restricted the options for the Japanese forces; have received scant mention from historians. The author seeks to rectify these oversights; and therein lies the greatest value of this book: that Willmott treats these other actions and topics of the battle without undue emphasis on any one specific action. It is in the beginning of Chapter 8 that Willmott spends a paragraph delineating what he had intended to accomplish with this book; and where he mentions that his goal was to “…set out the course of events at the expense of the inconsequential details that litter most accounts of these actions; which prima facie; seem to want to record every single hit on an American ship or deal with individuals or their actions in disproportionate detail to their importance; significance and effect.â€Willmott’s book deals with analysis and discussion on strategy and command; and the impact of logistical issues; especially the availability of fuel oil and its impact on events. One of the pervasive themes of the book is Willmott’s disdain for the “Great Man†theory of history; championed by Thomas Carlyle; and propagated to a harmful extent by that father of 20th century Unites States naval thought; Alfred Thayer Mahan. Willmott instead emphasizes a systematized approach to how battles are fought which overshadow the impact of individuals. On page 192 he elaborates on this idea by stating that; “…war was systemic and possessed qualities of state organization and control which did not exist before the middle of the nineteenth century.†Nevertheless; he spends time discussing the individual decisions of Halsey and Kurita; and speculating upon their intentions; given the information available; while admitting that posterity has little hope of ever knowing with finality; how Halsey could leave the San Bernardino Strait unguarded or why Kurita broke off his pursuit of the U.S. escort carrier group.Those readers already familiar with H.P. Willmott will not be surprised by the style of this book. I have previously read two of his: The Barrier and the Javelin; and Empires in the Balance; which deal with the early months of the Pacific War. Like those; The Last Fleet Action contains a remarkable synthesis of previous sources; examined exhaustively by Willmott; who has a keen eye for raising questions and making observations that previous historians have overlooked; or perhaps avoided. Those readers looking for an exciting action narrative; which emphasizes the valor of individuals; such as Commander Evans of the Johnston; and the crewman aboard the escort carriers and their screen of destroyers; should look elsewhere. Two that I have read and recommend are James Hornfischer’s Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors; and Evan Thomas’ Sea of Thunder. For Pacific War enthusiasts seeking serious; detailed analysis of the strategic; command; operational and logistical issues of the Battle of Leyte Gulf; however; The Last Fleet Action is highly recommended.0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Author needs to stick to the factsBy R.F.The author is highly opinionated of others and very willing to push enough of his personal insults; of which there are many; to distract from he historical details. I bought the book for its historical content; but could do without the character assassination he feels compelled to include.1 of 2 people found the following review helpful. Comprehensive; if poorly written; view of the Battle of Leyte GulfBy Seth NeumannComprehensive view of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. This is turning out to be a worthwhile book as it gives a comprehensive view of the whole series of fleet actions around Leyte Gulf in late October of 1944. We have recently been treated to some very well written andresearched accounts of the Battle of Samar (Hornfisher: Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors) and Surigao Straight (Tully: Battle of Surigao Straight); so an overview to tie all of the battles together in a single timeline is useful.That said; Willmott is pedantic and hard to follow. I almost had to pull out a piece of paper and diagram some of his sentences to understand what he was saying at points. His references fly off in all directions and given the difficulty of following footnotes on an e-reader; were generally lost to me. SInce he is fond of making arguments as numbered lists; he should provide outlines of some chapters so the arguments could be followed. The book has a few charts of formations but no maps tracing the positions of combatants. While he repeatedly refers to huge geographic scope of the battle; the book is woefully short on maps; again subject to the limitations of map examples in e-books. I think his editor did him a disservice by not cleaning this up a little.Back to content: Wilmott has little nice to say about anyone involved in the battles: (I quote loosely) "Kurita was so stupid he made Halsey look like an intellectual Giant" His general view of interviews and autobiographies after the war was that they were self-serving and disingenuous at best; and "mendacious; if not outright lies" at worst and the reader is left with no doubt as which interpretation Willmott favors....I would like a little more recognition that these men (on both sides) were fighting in the fog of war and without the benefit of 70 years of hindsight and that the Japanese knew this was all for a hopelessly lost cause; yet fought on -- if not too effectively. I am sure Kurita; in spite of how incredible it was that he didn't understand he was stalking escort carriers and not Halsey; had to have had concerns about sacrificing his remaining sailors in an action that would at best have no strategic significance. I am not sure that WillmoTt himself is not confusing fatigue; inferior radar and poor intelligence with stupidity. Having personally not been born until exactly 6 years after the events; I have the utmost admiration for the brave sailors on both sides who were willing to sacrifice themselves for their countries.That all said it is worth fighting through the stylistic issues and strong point of view.
