PDF The Battle for Moscow by David Stahel in History

Review

2 of 2 people found the following review helpful. Excellent case for this being the turn point; not Stalingrad.By Thomas M. MageeThis is an excellent book. He really makes the horror of the battle come alive in new ways and across all levels of combat. He takes the reader to the snow filled trenches to the fight between the Generals at the gates over tactics and supplies. He gives good context to the story. You will rethink the importance of the battle. You will see the battle as where the war changed; not Stalingrad. Their offense really culminated there and never was quite the same afterwards.That becomes very real when you read about the strength numbers of the Germans. Whole units were just grounded down to nothing from the constant battle since June. He also puts to death the almost idea. The Germans didn't almost make anything. Had they closed the last 40 miles or so they wouldn't have the strength to do the block by block fight which would have under gone. The masterful way the story was told about how the Germans shot their bolt will make you rethink the impact. of the Soviet counteroffensive. There wasn't anything but a handful of Germans left to push back. It was a mere academic exercise at that point.I loved his conclusion chapter. It sums up things in a nice package.9 of 9 people found the following review helpful. Excellent HistoryBy Bob McCroryI've learned a lot from all Mr. Stahel's books about the Eastern Front. Some reviewers seem to think he pushes his viewpoint somewhat aggressively; I have not noticed this. What I have noticed is a wealth of interesting and informative detail that I have not seen in other histories. I recommend all of Mr. Stahel's books; and this one in particular.10 of 11 people found the following review helpful. It wasn't even closeBy Marco PoloThis book both tells a riveting story and thoroughly debunks a myth. The story is the story of the German November 1941 effort to take Moscow; and the successful Soviet effort; not just to hold it; but to significantly wear down the German attackers.The myth debunked is the notion that the Germans came close to taking the city. They did in fact come close to the city; as measured in miles. But getting close to the objective is an empty achievement if the forces that have got close lack the means to capitalize on geographic proximity by outright taking the objective. [Or even; if that should be impossible; getting close enough to subject it to punishing artillery attack.]The author recounts in careful yet not dull style how the German drive was doomed from the start by a combination of supply difficulties; weather difficulties; and Soviet resistance. He recounts also how the Soviets held major reserves back from the fighting; parceling a bit of them out on rare occasion when the Germans had some unexpected tactical success which could not be permitted to blossom into operational significance. These reserves were intended for the Soviet December riposte; and they were eventually committed as planned; fresh and well supplied; to that effort. But if they had been needed to hold the city; they would have more than sufficed. The Soviets had stripped other sectors perilously thin to be sure of victory at Moscow; but having done so; they had a sure thing. (As to those other sectors; the book devotes relatively little space. But there is a nice little quote from the diary of Wilhelm Prueller; on hearing that his motorized division was to be sent East; less its vehicles; as infantry; from Kursk; with the mission of taking far-distant Voronezh. "How fatuous!...And all you can do the whole time you serve is to marvel. So I laughed; and laughed heartily; out of malicious joy at my own misfortune."And that about sums it up. The German drive on Moscow was a fool's errand and it never came close to taking the city.