ePub The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Strategies; February to June 1942 by H. P. Willmott in History

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0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Japanese rampage haltedBy Karun MukherjiSequel to’ Empires in the Balance ‘author sets out to describe the sequence of events between February to June 1942 . In the period two major naval battles ( Coral Sea; Midway) of World War II were fought in the Pacific. Here one could get detailed account of those conflicts.Author begins by sketching the background that set the stage for the epic clash between two navies. Japan was involved in a debilitating war in China. In order to free herself from western economic stranglehold the country planned to annex the resources of south east Asia. This set Tokyo in a collision course with status quo powers particularly the United States. Establishment of Japanese-led east Asia co- prosperity sphere was considered a threat to western economic interests as it knocked the bottom out American ‘open door’ policy. Americans retaliated by halting oil exports to Japan and by freezing Japanese economic assets in the United States. I don’t what to make of author’s claim that Washington officials did not realize the implications of such a policy. Ambassador Grew’s warnings American actions far from deterring Japan would push the country on the road to war fell on deaf ears.There is a rich fund of information on Japanese navy’s war fighting doctrines; operational concepts and strategy worked out to fight western powers. Japanese realized they were weaker to American opponent in numbers and proposed to counter quantitative inferiority with qualitative superiority. New class of imperial navy’s warships outgunned and outran their opponents. Latest development in the fields of optics; electronics and pyrotechnics were harnessed to add a lethal punch to the navy. Only in the field of radar development was Japanese lagging behind.Another feature of Japanese strategic matrix was subordination of material to moral factors. The nation relied on human resources to offset material weakness. Japanese believed the spirit of self sacrifice and willingness to court death could counter any material disadvantage. Traditional Japanese naval strategy envisaged US fleet sortie from Pearl Harbor with the decisive fleet action fought in western Pacific near Japanese home waters. On its way the US fleet would be attacked by submarines; aircraft based in the Japanese-held islands in the central Pacific which would whittle down American strength leading to equalization in force levels. However Pacific war opened in a different note. Attack on Pearl Harbor represented a significant shift from traditional to an unorthodox form of waging war. Admiral c-in-c Combined Fleet thought it was dangerous to have an open flank while Japanese forces were busy assaulting Malayan peninsula ;East Indies. American fleet based at Pearl Harbor was ideally placed to menace Japanese line of communications and had to be annihilated at the outset.Author’s study of Allied strategy in the Pacific has been lengthy; exhaustive. For some time American had to dilute their commitment to defeat Germany first by diverting resources to Pacific to hold the line. British were committed to the defense of Middle East .Australia felt her security endangered by Japanese advance looked toward Americans for help.After the initial triumph Japanese high command ; according to author; failed to evolve a coherent long term plan to win the war. Navy was pulled in several directions: Australia; south west Pacific; Indian ocean. Author argues plans were handicapped by army’s refusal to co operate. Among the options that lay open I found Kuroshima’s plan to extend operations to western Indian ocean region as the most deadly. Had that been implemented successfully it could have rocked the foundations of British empire. Instead Nagumo’s carriers launched a foray into the area and then backed off.Author has censured the Japanese for thinking they could keep the war limited. He has supplied reasons to show why this was not possible. Under the circumstances Japan was left with no option but continue with offensive operations until Anglo-American bloc was forced to negotiating table.Three chapters have been devoted to describe the actions at Coral sea. Even more space has been allotted on Midway. Salient features have all been familiar to me. Author; however; has elaborated considerably some key aspects of the campaign. What I found striking; fleets exchanged blows without coming into contact one another heralding a new era in naval combat. Bombers were vectored toward their targets based on sighting reports provided by scout planes.In the concluding section author has placed the American victories in proper perspective. Japanese defeat at Midway could never be deemed as decisive as battles around Solomon sea and Guadalcanal show that Imperial Navy still retained lot of its punch. What could be definitely said of those battles Americans regained strategic initiative lost after mauling US navy received at Pearl Harbor and quickly effected a transition from defensive to an offensive mode. Then began its drive to breach defense perimeter erected hoping to shield herself.I wouldn’t recommend this book for beginners; loaded with so much information that he could easily feel overwhelmed.2 of 2 people found the following review helpful. World War II in the Pacific -- Phase 2By William W. VodraThis book is the second in a trilogy by Willmott. The first; Empires in the Balance; explains Japan's dilemma in 1940-41 and why it chose war against 4 of the world's empires simultaneously -- France in Indo-China; Britain in Malaya; Singapore; Burma; and Borneo; the US in the Philippines; Wake; Guam; and Hawaii; and the Netherlands in the Dutch East Indies. It also explains how the Japanese brilliantly accomplished all of their immediate objectives so quickly and decisively; against 4 empires that really did not want to have war in teh Pacific at this point.Barrier and Javelin takes the Japanese; British; Australians; New Zealanders; and Americans forward from February to June 1942. It covers the key strategic choices facing each nation -- and especially those confronting Japan which had only a vague idea of what to do after its initial victories. Wilmott makes the point that; alone among the nations at war in 1942; Japan was not seeking total defeat of its adversaries. It had hoped that the West would; as it had in previous wars with Japan; seek terms quickly. This misjudgment; and the amazing American response to Pearl Harbor; the British abandonment of the ANZAC nations after the fall of Singapore; and the destruction of the feeble Dutch forces in the area; led to Japan's decision to move further into the South Pacific as well as to a second assault on the Hawaiian Islands at Midway. The stage is set for the battles for New Guinea and Guadacanal.Well written; thoroughly researched; impeccably balanced in presenting the strategic options for each party; and keeping at the high level -- this is not a blow-by-blow battle book -- Willmott makes the War in the Pacific understandable. A must read (with its predecssor) for any serious student of the War in the Pacific.2 of 2 people found the following review helpful. The Critical Months of the WarBy Bill PilonThis is the sequel to Empires in the Balance which covered the build up to war; the attack on Pearl Harbor and the loss of Java and the DEI. This one covers the fall of Malaya and the Philippines; Coral Sea and Midway. As with the first this is a great book!! Very lucid; easy to follow; grounded in the big picture but still lots of interesting detail. Willmott points out that both the Brits and Americans displayed almost criminally poor judgment reinforcing the Philippines and Singapore with a force they knew at the time would be inadequate to hold it and thus condemned tens of thousands of men to Japanese POW camps.Originally Willmott set out to write a trilogy on WWII in the Pacific; but he found that he needed two volumes just to get through Midway. He would probably have needed another volume just for the Solomons and God only know how many for the rest of the war. It seems that these two books make up two thirds of a projected trilogy; but I can't seem to figure out what the third book is or if it was ever published. Anyway; great read; highly recommended!!