PDF The Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy; Combat; Myths; Deceptions by Alan D. Zimm in History

Review

48 of 50 people found the following review helpful. Bad strategy; bad operation; bad tactics. And bad planning.By Steven ZorasterThe Japanese decision attack the United States in December 1941 was insane. I'll come back to this statement later.As mentioned in earlier reviews; this book uses modern operations research techniques to analyze the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at the levels of strategy; operations and tactics. In the process the reader learns the difference between deterministic and stochastic models of the efficiency of hits by bombs; torpedoes and shells on warships. The reader is also presented with many useful tables showing things like torpedo hit probabilities and ship damage possibilities under different attack scenarios. These tables are based on pre and post-war US and Japanese war college studies or on results of other naval battles during World War II. There are many good maps and many good photographs.The overall conclusion of the author is that the Pearl Harbor attack was poorly planned and executed at strategic; operational and tactical levels. At an operational level the plan worked; but only by chance. By this I mean that the Japanese carriers reached their launch point north of Oahu without being detected; and their first attack wave achieved a surprise attack. But this operational success resulted from luck and poor American reconnaissance. Toward the end of the book the author mentions that any type of reasonable precautions such as dawn fighter patrols off Oahu; or a properly manned control room able to react to the early radar contact with the incoming Japanese strike would have led to a massacre of the Japanese aircraft.There is a new interpretation of the goals of the Imperial Japanese Navy and Admiral Yamamoto; the driving force behind the attack on Pearl Harbor. The author argues convincingly that Yamamoto's first targets were American battleships; not American aircraft carriers. Yamamoto believed that immediately sinking one or more American battleships at the outbreak of the war would destroy American will to fight. This idea is not in line with most previous studies. Yamamoto is usually presented as a carrier oriented officer who would have wanted to strike American carriers first. The author seems to believe that battleships first was a rational goal; assuming weak US morale; since most wars end when one side decides it is no longer worth fighting; rather than by the complete destruction of one side.Interestingly; the author also shows that the Japanese aviators deviated from Yamamoto's goals by allocating more aircraft against carriers than would have been required if battleships were the primary target. As the author states; it is not good when goals of the most senior commanders are superseded by those of lower level officers!A tactical planning shortfall effecting Japanese success was the failure of the various types of naval aircraft to practice together before the attack. Training in Japan during October and November of 1941 was done separately for the fighters; dive bombers; torpedo bombers; and level bombers. I knew that the Japanese navy and army did not cooperate; but had no idea that combined training by the air components was also fragmented. The author points out that this lack of joint training was a prelude to the failure of the different types of Japanese aircraft to properly support each other during the attack on Pearl Harbor.Also on the tactical planning level the author is highly critical of the allocation of strike aircraft to various Oahu targets; the way the planned strike tracks for aircraft were allowed to cross on their final approach runs over the harbor; and the failure of the torpedo planes to provide mutual support during the first attack. The author also argues that the allocation of dive bombers during the second wave attack was horribly wrong. Other details concern things like a high rate of duds among the Japanese bombs; and the poor to non-existent central control over the first Japanese strike aircraft as they made their final approach to Pearl Harbor.Now back to my opening sentence. The Japanese started a war against the United States; with more than 6 times the industrial power; based on wrong assumptions about the willingness of the American people to fight. Willingness they regarded as weak. So the Japanese military; politicians; and Admiral Yamamoto himself; bet the future of the country on a wild gamble. A strategic gamble they would surely lose in a long war. Yamamoto may have come up with the best way to take advantage of this assumption about American will to fight; but it was a wrong assumption. Japan was almost destroyed on the resulting war. I repeat; the Japanese decision to enter the war was insane. That is just my definition of "insane"; but I hardly know what else to call it.As mentioned by a previous reviewer the book could have been better edited. Two important facts repeated almost word by word in the book are: The pre-attack engine setting experiments that led to greatly extending the range of the Japanese Zero fighter; and the number of American fighters that managed to get in the air during the first attack and the number of kills they made. I noted a number of smaller editing errors; including an event set in 1942 that obviously occurred in 1941.One reviewer mentioned an online article about the British carrier attack on Taranto that might have been usefully cited by the author of this book. I found the article and it argues that the British planning of their attack on Taranto suffered from some of the same tactical failings that the Japanese demonstrated at Pearl Harbor. I am sure there is some lesson here; but I am not sure what it is.In summary; I enjoyed reading this book; as it gives a much different take on the Pearl Harbor attack and backs its interpretation with a lot of facts. I would not have been able to write such a long review if the book did not have lots of useful information. And there is a lot of information I have not covered in this review. (What about those miniature submarines; were they a good idea?) But; the book deserved better editing.13 of 13 people found the following review helpful. A Fresh Take on Pearl HarborBy Bill PilonAlan D. Zimm is a former naval officer who works in the Aviation Systems and Advanced Concepts Group at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. In this book he uses Operations Research methods and computer simulations (based on U.S. Naval War College combat models from the period) to analyze the attack resulting in a very detailed evaluation; on both the operational and tactical levels; of the attack.The results of the analysis are very interesting. Zimm's conclusion is that contrary to "conventional wisdom" which describes a group of very experienced and expert Japanese pilots executing a brilliantly planned operation with almost total success; the attack was actually pretty poorly planned and executed; with far less damage inflicted that might have been the case had the Japanese airstrike been effectively planned and controlled. Among the things pointed out by Zimm:- Lacking effective radios; the Japanese pilots were pretty much "on their own" one they got over target and outside the visual signal range of their commanders- Fuchida; in addition to being somewhat "careless with the truth"; bungled the start of the attack by screwing up the signal indicating whether or not surprise had been achieved- The aircrew involved in the attack where not nearly as veteran and experienced as usually assumed; which may explain why the US fighters that did get airborne achieved a 4:1 kill ratio against the attackers- The planning was really poor; with haphazard resource allocation and target selection. For example; despite having a fairly well formed doctrine on the need for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD); the Japanese planners failed to incorporate SEAD into their attack plan. Consequently; during the attack. American AA was very effective at interfering with torpedo attacks.- There was no plan for a third attack against the infrastructure and/or oil storage facilities and even had the Japanese mounted such an attack; they simply didn't have the resources to inflict significant damage and the damage they did inflict would have repaired within months.Finally; Zimm makes the point that the attack was a strategic and operational failure. Essentially it unnecessarily embroiled the Japanese in a "total war" they couldn't possibly hope to win without gaining them any significant strategic advantage.I not sure I totally buy his thesis; but it was a very interesting and thought provoking read. I recommend this one very highly to anyone who is interested in the Pearl Harbor attack and WWII in the Pacific.4 of 4 people found the following review helpful. Review of tactics and strategyBy Arthur Van PeltWhile the author's stated purpose is to examine Operation Hawaii from a tactical viewpoint;the book encompasses both strategy and tactics. Zimm's main thesis is that Operation Hawaiiwas not a near perfect plan; as he claims many believe. I think he exaggerates theextent to which the operation is considered "textbook." Most of the examples he puts forward insupport of his thesis are well known to students of the actual attack. I got the feeling thathe is so determined to prove his thesis that he sometimes misses the point that errorscommitted by the Japanese attackers were often insignificant in their effects. He spends pagesarguing about whether Fuchida is credible in his accounts; and goes beyond logic sometimes;aswhen he claimed that Fuchida's account of his dispute with Nagumo and Kasaka over the need fora second attack - Zimm states that no one can confirm this. Well; that would be difficult; sincethere were only three participants and at most only two were still alive by the time Fuchida wrote his memoirs. And Kasaka would hardly be likely to confirm such an account; which makes him look a foolin the eye's of the world.Generally; Zimm sides with Nagumo and against Yamamoto; Fuchida and Genda. In other words; he isout to reverse the generally accepted notions about the attack and its authors He also does notcompletely buy into the widely held belief that battleships had been replaced by carriers (whichhe characterizes as "fragile") as the premier naval weapon. He does agree with the popular belief thatstrategically; the PH attack was really dumb; but he is off base in laying the blame on Yamamoto.Yamamoto was opposed to the decision by Japan's military rulers to go to war against the US; and any claims that it was PH that broght the US into the conflict are absurd - the Philippines; and the American army stationed there were going to be attacked; Pearl Harbor or no Pearl Harbor;and that meant certain war. Considering his situation; Yamamoto's Operation Hawaii made more sense than anything the General Staff had come up with. He did make some mistakes concerning the midget submarines; although he may have been under the impression that they were more capable than they turned out to be. If they had worked as advertised; they would have provided a lot of additional firepower and would have been valuable. Zimm'scriticisms of Genda are of the hair splitting variety and not always logical; as when he claims thatGenda should have discarded any ideas of finding the carriers in port ; since a report Saturdayindicated they were not at home. But that information would have been a day old by the time of the attackand American ships most often returned to port on weekends. In fact; Enterprise would have been in port; were it not delayed enroute. Genda's decision was correct; but irregardless; the only actual effects from employing Zimm's strategy would have been very minor. He does agree; unconditionally; that both Kimmel and Short were incompetent. His logic as to reconnaissance I found incomplete - he seemingly accepted Kimmel's notion that 360 degree searches were necessary; although he did point out that they didn't need to extend as far as Kimmel claimed in order to provide adequate warning time. Of course; 360 degree searches would have been totally absurd; by at least 180 degrees. And Zimm did not mention the fact that Kimmel had lots of vessels (mostly submarines) that could have been used for picket duty; as wasthe norm for the Japanese Navy. Everyone knows that Kimmel's real reason for no reconnaissance was his firm belief that the Japanese Navy could not do what it did (from his own lips;on more than one occassion). Zimm also claims that destruction of the tank farms and/or repair facilitesi would not have had the disastrous effect many believe. However; both Nimmitz and Spruance shared that belief; and I'm inclined totake their word rather than Zimm's. Too bad they are not with us to debate the issue. I cannot believe that anyone knew the Pacific Fleet's innards better than those two. Anyone seriously interested in the nuts and bolts of the attack is well advised to read this book. You can judge for yourself how effectively Zimm has made his case that Operation Hawaii was shot thru with errors and mistakes. But be warned that there are pages and pages of arguments that may seemmostly irrelevant and also many pages of bomb weights; etc. In my opinion; he proves his thesis;but sometimes goes overboard and adopts too narrow a view. The book does contain a lot of informationthat contradicts previous accounts with respect to the details (flight paths; etc). I found myself skipping past the pages of details on weaponry.