When General Ormsby Mitchel and his Third Division; Army of the Ohio; marched into North Alabama in April 1862; they initiated the first occupation of an inland region in the Deep South during the Civil War. As an occupying force; soldiers were expected to adhere to President Lincoln's policy of conciliation; a conservative strategy based on the belief that most southerners were loyal to the Union. Confederate civilians in North Alabama not only rejected their occupiers' conciliatory overtures; but they began sabotaging Union telegraph lines and trains; conducting guerrilla operations; and even verbally abusing troops. Confederates' dogged resistance compelled Mitchel and his men to jettison conciliation in favor of a "hard war" approach to restoring Federal authority in the region. This occupation turned out to be the first of a handful of instances where Union soldiers occupied North Alabama. In this first book-length account of the occupations of North Alabama; Joseph Danielson opens a new window on the strength of Confederate nationalism in the region; the Union's evolving policies toward defiant civilians; and African Americans' efforts to achieve lasting freedom. His study reveals that Federal troops' creation of punitive civil-military policies—arrests; compulsory loyalty oaths; censorship; confiscation of provisions; and the destruction of civilian property—started much earlier than previous accounts have suggested. Over the course of the various occupations; Danielson shows Union soldiers becoming increasingly hardened in their interactions with Confederates; even to the point of targeting Rebel women. During General William T. Sherman's time in North Alabama; he implemented his destructive policies on local Confederates a few months before beginning his "March to the Sea." As Union soldiers sought to pacify rebellious civilians; African Americans engaged in a host of actions to undermine the institution of slavery and the Confederacy. While Confederate civilians did their best to remain committed to the cause; Danielson argues that battlefield losses and seemingly unending punitive policies by their occupiers led to the collapse of the Confederate home front in North Alabama. In the immediate post-war period; however; ex-Confederates were largely able to define the limits of Reconstruction and restore the South's caste system. War's Desolating Scourge is the definitive account of this stressful chapter of the war and of the determination of Confederate civilians to remain ideologically committed to independence—a determination that reverberates to this day.
#851576 in Books University Press of Kansas 2005-09-08Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.16 x 1.17 x 6.38l; 1.43 #File Name: 0700613978330 pages
Review
0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Communist Military Leadership failuresBy Dietz Ziechmann; ShofetReese; a history professor and US Army veteran of un-publicized rank; makes a very useful; and apparently objective; study of the strengths and weakness;its inheriting and then greatly exacerbating the lack of core professionalism in first the Czarist; and then the Soviet officer corps; citing specific; documented instances and sources. The Red; then since 1946; Soviet; Army and other armed forces had their primary focus of loyalty on the Soviet Communist Party and the dominant faction in its Central Committee; whoever happened to constitute that factor and the current Party General- Secretary. Reese makes important distinctions between the Civil War to World War; WWII; and post-WWII and post-Stalin and Gorbachev periods. Reese shows how educational deficiencies (both civil: literacy; math; language skills; culture; and military: technical and tactical)and lack of platoon through brigade experience before taking on higher command responsibilities contributed to a lack of empathy and command judgement at those higher levels. He also shows how placing responsibility for morale and well-being of the troops into the hands of political workers/officers (PUR); not military officers led to a growing indifference about those categories and estrangements between officers and men. In the post-WWII era; the military officers came to constitute something of a self-enclosed privileged class allied to the interests of the Central Committee and the Soviet Military Industrial Commission (VPK); the Russian equivalent of the American military- industrial complex on steroids. Finally; we see; in the Gorbachev era; how serving officers running for elective office delivery an ironic; final blow to what might have been the professionalism of the Soviet officer corps.Reese apparently confirms Viktor Suvorov's claims that the Great Purge of 1937 onward contributed less to Soviet military inefficiencies in 1939-1941 onwards than has been generally assumed. Ironically; Reese makes no use of Suvorov's contentious books and studies; including Suvorov's observations that the winter timing of the launch of the Finnish war exacerbated the inefficiencies of the Red Army in that conflict or that the offensive dispositions of the Red Army in 1941 in line with Soviet doctrine contributed to its catastrophe defeats.Reese walzes around a central factor in this story: if Lenin had built an uncoerced consensus behind his political goals; he would not have needed to construct such a dual track leadership of his armed forces. In the 1920s; ironically while most of the Communist leadership favored a militia organization for the armed forces; instead of a standing army; while simultaneously dreaming of exporting a world revolution.3 of 3 people found the following review helpful. Bursts some bubblesBy James D. CrabtreeA very good work; this book discusses the Red Army officer corps from its inception to its disintegration. The author uses several sources to look at "typical" Soviet officers at different period of the Red Army's existence; including the Purge era; post WWII; etc. Changes in demographics; schooling and political influence are all discussed. First-hand accounts are used whenever possible.I found it especially interesting that Mr. Reese chose not to perpetuate the idea that "the best and the brightest" were eliminated during the Purge; paving the way for the disaster that the Red Army suffered when Germany attacked. As the author pointed out; bad officers must have also been eliminated; since the Purge seems to have been almost arbitrary.An excellent book but not a light read.6 of 7 people found the following review helpful. Very critical of the Soviet officer corpsBy 1.Reese writes that the Soviet officer failed to develop an independent identity; impose dicipline in the ranks; and train small units. Reese mantains that the Soviet officer corps lacked a professional sense of identity since Soviet officers had to be members of the Communist party and this involved them in interparty disputes further political commissars with no professional abilities could be generals. Soviet officers also used commissars to try to impose order in the ranks and this made them fail to have any sense of group identity with the ranks. Furthermore; this neglect of enlisted men; made it possible for abuse to occur betweem NCOs and lower ranking members of the Red army. Soviet officers also did not develop small unit tactics that required individual intiative; and this greatly impeded the effectiveness of the Red Army throughout its history. The only weakness of the book is that Reese leaves out the reason why that the Soviet officer corps managed to conduct effective strategic moves; such as the 1944 summer offensive; during the Second World while failed in the area of tactics. I would greatly reccomend this book for anyone has an interest Russian military history.
