When Union General George McClellan marched toward the Confederate capital of Richmond in 1862; he encountered the Warwick River "where it wasn't supposed to be." McClellan was following a map created by an esteemed topographer; but the map was wrong! "The Cram Map" that McClellan was using is one of the removable maps in Great Maps of the Civil War. So is the map Union Gen. James B. McPherson was carrying when he was killed on July 22; 1864; just east of Atlanta. "Commanders moving their armies . . . often had to advance slowly; groping their way blindly;" says William Miller. "They used what maps they could find; but most contained serious errors. . . . Studies of Civil War maps usually focus on handsome; postbattle maps of battlefields. . . . While these maps explain how a battle was fought; they do nothing to help us answer the questions about why a battle or campaign was conducted as it was." The maps in Great Maps of the Civil War are the ones the commanders actually used or were likely to have been available to them.
#451647 in Books Sandy Woodward 1997-10-30Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 8.93 x .89 x 5.98l; 1.20 #File Name: 1557506523416 pagesOne Hundred Days The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander
Review
2 of 2 people found the following review helpful. Honest; well written; and very goodBy Bill HenslerI had purchased the book and it set on a shelf until the death of the death of former Prime Minister Thatcher. At this time I decided to read the book.In 1982 it was a rather close run affair that the British had retaking the Falklands from the Argentinian Military. The book starts with the low point of the British campaign - the sinking of HMS Sheffield - and then the book follows in chronological order until the Falkland's campaign. It was quite good and entertaining. At no point is the story slow. However; some parts are a lot faster than others. When the British task force is covering the Royal Army Marines landing the results sort of reminds a casual reader of WWII: aircraft are lost and ships sunk at quite a rate. Admiral Woodward makes the observation that in the warfare the rate of ship to aircraft loss is about 10 Argentine aircraft to one ship; be it Frigate or Destroyer.Admiral Woodward fights his forces and does an excellent job in the placement. The destroyers protect the carriers and in turn the carriers' aircraft of Harriers and Helicopters protect the fleet. Of particular note was observations of the British Missile Systems and the Type 42 Destroyers. The Type 42s were too wet in any seas; surprising for a British ship; and this affected the weapons systems. In many instances the weapons would not work because they were somewhat damaged by lack of protection in rough sea conditions. The two missile systems; Sea Wolf and Sea Dart; never quite performed to specifications and must have seemed very perplexing to both American Soviet Observers at the time.While the loss of Sheffield can be seen as the low point in the campaign the turning point is done by the British SAS. Every day they would attend the briefings and offer Admiral Woodward little. Then when he openly worried about being attacked by Argentinian fighter bombers the SAS said they could take them out. Woodward gave them 5 days to accomplish the mission and in exactly 5 days the mission was done. The US Military watched and has spent quite a bit of time and talent making US Army Delta Forces and Navy SEALs the equal of the SAS. What this small group of men did for the landing was invaluable.Woodward admits the mistake of using the frigates as minesweepers; but at the time I think he had little choice. Additionally; while the British submarines are useful for checking the larger Argentinian Navy it's surprising they have limited stalking ability. With the exception of the nuclear power plants and some communication gear the sonar and sensor systems are not greatly improved from the prior WWII era and stalking the Aircraft Carrier 25th of May becomes extremely problematic in Woodward's view. He worries quite a bit about being caught in a pincer-attack like the American Navy was at the Battle of Guadalcanal in late 1942. The sinking of the Argentinian light cruiser - General Belgrano - removed the possibility of being caught in a pincer. Indeed; the Argentinian Brooklyn class cruiser had more firepower than the whole of Woodward's frigates and Destroyers. Still; he would have rather the submarines sunk the carrier 25th-of-May because the A-4 attack jets; operating from land bases; sank at least one of his ships.This is an honest book with a good commander who expects the best of his subordinates. He is honest with his mistakes. He praises his men and talks about the defaults in his equipment. He views the U.K. as having been extremely lucky to have a good friend in the US government - which gave the British 100 war winning AIM-9L missiles and the Argentine government's poor timing as having invaded six months prior to the scheduled decommissioning of the ships that won the war.This is a five star book on the last British colonial war. The men who fought it were truly the type of men who built the empire. Conversely; one sees too much modern media at play; such as when the BBC tells the Argentinian military the bombs were set incorrectly for the fuses and the BBC announces the time of an attack. It's amazing a few of the soldiers didn't get personal revenge on the writers and editors at the BBC.I enjoyed this book and how a good commander helps defend one of the last British colonies. America would do well with such a government.3 of 3 people found the following review helpful. Fantastic battle study of the British naval campaignBy Joel R.British Admiral Sandy Woodward recalls his experiences from the 1982 War in the Falklands in this 1992 classic; "One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of The Falklands Battle Group Commander." He offers very candid and poignant perspectives on what it was like to bear the burden of command of this naval armada. Even in 2010; this is an important work since the War in the Falklands is still the only war featuring a successful; sustained aerial assault of jet aircraft against a naval battle group.Sir Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins "The Battle for the Falklands" is still the most complete book on the campaign; featuring not only the combat operations; but also the political perspectives of London; Buenos Aires; and Washington DC. Readers will learn about the operational level of war for the naval combat in this book. This book is a perfect complement to Brigadier Julian Thompson's "3 COMMANDO BRIGADE IN THE FALKLANDS: No Picnic"1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Read this if you study this campaignBy Kenneth BynumI read this in parallel with Hastings ("Battle for the Falklands"; published soon after the war and sadly inaccurate on details; but good for UK political background and overall coverage) and Middlebrook ("The Argentine Fight for the Falklands"; he had access to Argentine records and participants and is more accurate on details; with a good view from the other side).Adm. Woodward's memoirs are required reading if you want to understand this complex land/sea/air campaign; because he was the one who was there and did it. The narrative is at times almost dipolar; sometimes thoughtful/insecure/self-effacing and at others cold/hard/kiss my arse. Hey; I never met an actual admiral; maybe that's how they are. The tactical details don't add much to what you get from other sources; but he does give a little in the way of logistics; a seldom appreciated aspect of strategic war. His respect and admiration for the men and officers under his command comes through loud and clear. Read it; you may not like it (or him) but you will definitely learn something.
