The year 1989 brought the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. It was also the year that the economic theories of Reagan; Thatcher; and the Chicago School achieved global dominance. And it was these neoliberal ideas that largely determined the course of the political; economic; and social changes that transformed Europe―both east and west―over the next quarter century. This award-winning book provides the first comprehensive history of post-1989 Europe.Philipp Ther―a firsthand witness to many of the transformations; from Czechoslovakia during the Velvet Revolution to postcommunist Poland and Ukraine―offers a sweeping narrative filled with vivid details and memorable stories. He describes how liberalization; deregulation; and privatization had catastrophic effects on former Soviet Bloc countries. He refutes the idea that this economic "shock therapy" was the basis of later growth; arguing that human capital and the “transformation from below†determined economic success or failure. Most important; he shows how the capitalist West's effort to reshape Eastern Europe in its own likeness ended up reshaping Western Europe as well; in part by accelerating the pace and scope of neoliberal reforms in the West; particularly in reunified Germany. Finally; bringing the story up to the present; Ther compares events in Eastern and Southern Europe leading up to and following the 2008–9 global financial crisis.A compelling and often-surprising account of how the new order of the New Europe was wrought from the chaotic aftermath of the Cold War; this is essential reading for understanding Europe today.
#1231991 in Books Lewis John David 2013-12-26 2013-12-26Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.21 x .93 x 6.14l; 1.25 #File Name: 0691162026368 pagesNothing Less Than Victory Decisive Wars and the Lessons of History
Review
0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. something amissBy fred debrostoo bad lewis died. i fully subscribe to most. it would have lent strength to juxtapose our longest war; the war against the pirates of the coast of barbary; that should have ended like the marines planned in total unconditional surrender of the paschas once and forever ; instead ended in a gloriously written peace agreement in 1805.here we are 200 years later bombing the sons of the ottomans; isis at the very same spot we stopped in 1804; sirte; with our most moden weapons; b2's. the casus belli ist unchanged: piracy and kidnappings; evil. in between lie 200 years of incessant wars from atatuerk to rommel and eisenhower and hillary clinton.....incredible. but wait; theres more: carthago and the punic wars; then the visigoths....i think libya has been plowed over for centuries by swords and bombs and tanks. and there is no end in sight....nothing unless we get total unconditional victory there!i hope victor davis hansen completes that book!1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Has the idea of "Victory" been forgotten?By Michael HaganWith no real end in sight in the War on Terror; the "new normal" of constant deployments and unending conflict is a condition that the majority of the military has come to accept. Is there a better way?In a wide survey of history beginning with the Theban Wars (382 BC) and culminating with the successful occupation of Japan (1945); John David Lewis argues that protracted warfare is never a necessity; but rather a result of flawed strategy and political failure. War is always quick when fought with proper objectives and aimed at the enemies ideological center of gravity."The lives of soldiers and civilians depend upon clear statements of the objectives to be achieved and a commitment to create the resources necessary to prevail;" Lewis argues. "Without clearly stated; rational objectives;" war becomes "a circular process of bloodshed rather than a goal-directed offense; and military victories on the battlefield [become] irrelevant to the outcome..." Lewis explains that in all of his examples; aggressors launch wars "bent on loot; conquest; or slaves" and that the defenders were unable to act as long as they failed to properly identify the threat. In fact; the defenders "abetted the slaughter as long as they failed to confront the true source of the attacks. Once they did; the battle and the conflict turned quickly in their favor."Dr. Lewis is a visiting associate professor of philosophy; politics; and economics at Duke University. He draws on over 2;000 years of Western History to demonstrate the need for quick; decisive victory.For example; in 208 B.C. the Romans had been invaded by Hannibal; and lost during every attempt to oppose him directly. The Roman leader Quintus Fabius implemented a defensive strategy where towns were evacuated and burned that were in the path of Hannibal. Only this scotched-earth policy of "Fabian-delay" could manage Hannibal despite placing Roman civilians in the situation of having to accept an invading army on their soil indefinitely. This situation went on for 15 years with no hope of resolution in sight when Scipio Africanus finally developed a solution. He brilliantly overcame the false alternative of either accepting the roaming enemies on his soil verses launching ineffective attacks against Hannibal. Scipio decided to raise an army and launch a quick; decisive attack against Carthage itself. This resulted in Hannibal rushing back to Carthage to defend his homeland; and an ultimate Roman victory at Zama which ended of the war and established a lasting peace.Although Lewis does not state the parallels; it is impossible not to see the relationship between our current "fortress America" of metal detectors and color-coded security warnings; and the situation the Roman's found themselves in during Hannibal's invasion when "an entire generation of Romans grew used to a foreign army on its home soil."In one of the most compelling chapters; Dr. Lewis launches what is probably the most systematic ethical defense of the nuclear bombing of Japan ever written. Citing the projected casualty figures of the planned ground invasion of Japan; the suicidal last-ditch defense planned by Japanese Leaders; the fact that the Japanese-- not American soldiers-- were responsible for the war; and a myriad of other factors; John Lewis contends that the use of Atomic bombs was the only moral and practical course of action. Lewis explains that "the complete loss of hope was central to Japan's decision to surrender" and that only a demonstration that "Americans were willing and able to remain offshore and bomb Japan into the bedrock" could result in an immediate end to the war.Military readers will come away with a better grasp of history; and will be compelled by the argument that war can only be won with a decisive attack on the enemy's ideological; political; and social center of gravity."These wars were fought by commanders who were oriented toward solid objectives and who used flexible strategies to pursue firm goals with an inflexible will..." summarizes Lewis. "Each struck to the center of his enemy's strength; and achieved a physical victory that extinguished the moral and ideological fire behind the fight."1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Wonderful substance; must-read for lovers of history; sloppy digital conversion (?) (Kindle Edition)By Fabian BollingerI thoroughly enjoyed the substance of this book; and indeed it greatly helped me make up my mind about the proper conduct of warfare. The lesson; that moral ideas are to be taken seriously as a/the major cause of human events; is of incalculable value to any student of history; whether he is interested specifically in affairs of war; or not. Nothing else will adequately explain how; time after time; a seemingly inferior force can achieve overwhelming strength; whether it be the ancient Greeks successfully standing up to a ridiculously stronger Persian army; or Germany going from a defeated nation with no military to speak of; back to being the dominating power in Continental Europe; able to set the world ablaze once more within a span of barely twenty years.Much as I loved the substance of the book; however; I must criticize the often sloppy conversion in the Kindle edition; which I read. (At least I hope the same errors aren't in the print edition!) Words are missing; spaces within a word where it is obv iously unintentional; typos abound. For just one concrete example: the ultimate conclusion of the book; in its last sentence; misspells the Latin phrase: "Sic [sic!] vis pacem; para bellum" - it is; of course; supposed to be "si".4 stars because the sloppy editing ought not to keep any lover of history from appreciating the substance of this book; but needs to be remarked upon nonetheless.
