Designed with little more than a passing nod to the international naval treaties of the inter-war period; the Imperial Japanese Navy's heavy cruisers were fast and heavily armed. Like the other vessels of the Japanese Navy; the heavy cruisers were technologically superior to and far more innovative than their Allied rivals; whom they met in many of the major Pacific Theater battles; including Midway and Leyte Gulf. Mark Stille continues his study of the IJN of WWII with this fascinating topic; addressing the design and development of all 18 ships in the six heavy cruiser classes; from pre-war construction and mid-war alterations; their operational histories and eventual fates.
#1317847 in Books 2008-09-18Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 8.84 x 1.12 x 5.76l; 1.17 #File Name: 1848325010304 pages
Review
2 of 2 people found the following review helpful. A fine piece of historical writing from one of the 19th C's greatestBy Avon Napoleonic FellowshipThe heart of this book is Dodge's analysis of the actions and mistakes of the key `actors'; chiefly focussed on Napoleon. Each stage and phase of the campaign is described in detail; principally from the French perspective. This is complemented by numerous quotes and Dodge's insightful analysis and critique. Detailed line drawings of generals and figures from specific military units; so often seen in books published in the late 19th and early 20th century; are dotted throughout the text. These are fine pieces in themselves; add a nice touch and break up the blocks of text nicely.As one would expect from a book that covers the entire campaign; the battles and actions are described in strategic rather than tactical terms; with only the main movements or actions mentioned. For example; his description of the great battle of Borodino describes the movements and actions of divisions and corps rather than those of brigades or units. The grand tactical view of the battle does not make it any the less compelling to read; with Dodge painting a fine word picture of the colossus struggle. "This massing of men and the tremendous array of guns opened the way for frightful losses" (p. 157). Contrary to many authors and commentators; Dodge's conclusion about the battle; and particularly Napoleon's decision not to use the Guard; is that it was justified at the time based on what Napoleon knew of the situation; but; with the benefit of hindsight and knowledge not known to Napoleon; was incorrect (pp. 166-171).Pleasingly; the book features numerous; detailed maps. While these are not as clear as those we have come to expect in more recent publications; they complement the text well. All of the towns that Dodge mentions are either indicated on a map or clearly evident from the location of forces indicated on the maps. That said; it takes some effort to track the movements of the formations and this would have been greatly enhanced by the addition of arrows and the like on each map; rather than simply towns; roads and rivers. One can hardly criticise the book for this though and I am pleased that the publishers have reproduced it in the original format with original maps.The book concludes with a reproduction of Napoleon's 29th bulletin in full. As Dodge notes; "whatever its prevarications; in view of the fact that those were not the days of special war correspondents and telegraphs; and compared with the reports of other unsuccessful campaigns by the commanding generals; it will hold its own". It is salutary reading and is a fine way to conclude what is a fine book.
