audiobook MacArthur (Great Generals (Hardcover)) by Richard B. Frank in History

Review

5 of 6 people found the following review helpful. A "quick write" not up to the standards of a great historianBy Eric BergerudRichard Frank is one of the ablest historians writing on the Pacific War. His "Guadalcanal" is a classic military narrative that will serve as a kind of official history for decades. His book "Downfall" about the end of the Pacific War is another splendid effort that cannot be ignored if one wishes to understand the horrible events between Okinawa and war's end. I believe he is presently working on a larger scale work on WII in Asia (including China) and I'll be one of the first to read it. The one thing that has marked Frank's major works is extremely thorough and extensive research.The MacArthur book is a real let down. It's part of the "Great Generals" series edited by Wesley Clark. This was not intended to be a definitive military biography of MacArthur. The sources show it too - a lot of secondary stuff and I would guess nothing original. (I apologize in advance if that's wrong.) Frank says that it's "OK to hate MacArthur; you just have to know why." It is not easy to tell what there is to hate by reading Frank's book. Frank is critical of the defense of the PI in 1941-42. I'd be careful there. There were a lot of cooks ruining that broth including Marshall and FDR who decided in a heartbeat (after the oil embargo was declared) that they had been wrong in refusing to arm the soon to be independent PI; and couldn't face the consequences of simply abandoning the American garrison there as was implicit in the last of the Orange Plans. I don't know why MacArthur or Marshall believed war was not likely before April 42; but the American defense plans were based on the assumptions. So when the war came; Mac had to do with what he had which was grossly inadequate. (Might note he was let down by a still hard to explain failure of 23 modern US subs to do anything against Japanese merchant ships which arrived at exactly the place everyone on both sides expected.) The PI forces couldn't stand against the Japanese; but they were able to get to Bataan in a well guided retreat. Unfortunately for the US; the supplies intended to keep a military garrison in operation for six months were grossly inadequate to the task of supplying a group of civilians and PI soldiers four times that size. As it was; the allied garrison in the PI held out for nearly six months - exactly as foreseen in Orange.It was the decision to send MacArthur to Australia that gets the general in hot water with Frank. While there MacArthur bombarded the Pentagon with an endless string of messages giving advice on every subject concerning WWII (many of them not so unreasonable - others a little nutty) and irritated Marshall and infuriated Stimson. Why FDR didn't tell Stimson to shut MacArthur up is a toughie. Neither men liked MacArthur but seemed to think MacArthur's status as "hero of Bataan" made him beyond discipline. A dubious conclusion in my eyes that says nothing good about our top leaders. Frank doesn't nitpick every move made by MacArthur during the Kokoda-Buna campaign but misses something that should be fundamental starting point for understanding that campaign - the battle was run by the Aussies. Only one regiment plus of the 32d Division was under direct US command and its movements were to coordinate with the larger campaign run by the AIF. MacArthur always manipulated the press (nothing rare for a general) but when the smoke is cleared the Kokoda-Buna campaign was a huge allied victory that; given the extraordinary logistic difficulties faced; could not have been won quicker or with fewer losses.Frank gives MacArthur credit for the "island hopping" campaign that despite paltry forces led back to the road back to Leyte in October 44. As Frank notes it was these campaigns that won for MacArthur the admiration of AlanBrooke and Montgomery. Was the war in the PI needed? We'll never know; but the SWPAC advance caused a complete dislocation of Japan's strategic reserve when the tide turned - nearly a million IJA troops and thousands of aircraft were moved first to New Guinea and later to the PI. If the campaign had not taken place; is it unreasonable to think that the Japanese would have choked the Central Pacific bases with men and supplies while it was still possible to do so? Given the nature of the battles there; GIs and Marines were probably fortunate that there were about 10;000 men on Iwo instead of three times that. Ditto with Saipan and Okinawa.Oddly Frank doesn't clobber MacArthur in Korea where I think it probably should have been done. Despite the spectacular nature of Inchon; it's not at all clear that a reinforcement at Pusan would not have led to crushing breakout. If MacArthur wanted to continue to the Yalu - a no doubt blunder - he did so with the cheers and support of the Truman administration across the board. (I suppose it's possible that had MacArthur not reacted as quickly as he did in mid 1950 that the North Koreans would have taken all of Korea. Let's not forget that war in Korea proved to be a tremendous strategic victory for the US.)If you want to longer and more detailed trashings of MacArthur; they're out there. William Manchester wrote a adulatory biography that borders on silly. But if any reader wants to examine in detail the extraordinary life of Douglas MacArthur I strongly urge reading "Old Soldiers Never Die" a brilliant and insightful book by the splendid military and political historian Geoffrey Perret. And if you haven't read Frank at his best; I urge you to do so.0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Five StarsBy Walt concernedVery good. Thank you.0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Five StarsBy Phillip J Materigood