At the end of his landmark 1994 book; The Soul of the American University; historian George Marsden asserted that religious faith does indeed have a place in today's academia. Marsden's contention sparked a heated debate on the role of religious faith and intellectual scholarship in academic journals and in the mainstream media. The contributors to Confessing History: Explorations in Christian Faith and the Historian's Vocationexpand the discussion about religion's role in education and culture and examine what the relationship between faith and learning means for the academy today.The contributors to Confessing Historyask how the vocation of historian affects those who are also followers of Christ. What implications do Christian faith and practice have for living out one's calling as an historian? And to what extent does one's calling as a Christian disciple speak to the nature; quality; or goals of one's work as scholar; teacher; adviser; writer; community member; or social commentator? Written from several different theological and professional points of view; the essays collected in this volume explore the vocation of the historian and its place in both the personal and professional lives of Christian disciples."Confessing History fills a large gap in the literature on Christian and especially evangelical historiography. I know of no other book or anthology of scholarly articles that so carefully analyzes how believing historians should work within the intellectual expectations of the guild. And it does so with pristine prose; impressive erudition; and charity of spirit. After reading Confessing History; I find myself compelled to take the prescriptions and proscriptions of the secular academy less seriously and my identity as a Christian historian more seriously." --Grant Wacker; Duke University"How to reconcile religious commitment with the practices of the guild is one of the really big questions for believing historians. Confessing Historyis essential reading not only for them; but also for any wishing to understand the important issues at stake. In its pages we witness the concerns; questions; and yearnings of a new generation of believing historiansÑand perhaps even the contours of a new approach to Christian historical scholarship." --Donald Yerxa; Director; The Historical Society "This collection of essays represents serious; sustained; multivalent; and cogent reflection on challenges for Christian historians as experienced by a mostly younger set of scholars. The volume acknowledges foundational work on such subjects carried out by a collection of older evangelical and Reformed scholars--including Ronald Wells; Darryl Hart; and George Marsden--but also moves well beyond these earlier voices; sometimes critiquing what they have written; but also sometimes venturing off into new directions." --Mark Noll; University of Notre Dame
#1493221 in Books 2008-07-15 2008-07-15Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.25 x 1.45 x 6.12l; 2.05 #File Name: 0253351057472 pages
Review
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Thought provoking and worth reading; but needs some workBy ErinOverall I enjoyed reading this book and it's focus on big-picture strategy; and I'd like to give it a good score; however there were several issues that lead me to lowering my rating:1) This book badly needs an editor. There were numerous small errors that were clearly the result of poor editing; for instance west vs. east got mixed up once and in another place the author mentions how the "Japanese airforce liked the Marianas as a location to launch B-29 attacks against Tokyo from" (think he meant US Army Airforce based on context).2) Adams needs to update the book in light of recent research. In particular the work of Parshall and Tully in "Shattered Sword" would benefit the Midway chapter. Also Adams' excessive criticism of Vice Admiral Fletcher at Guadalcanal is badly out of date after Lundstrom's "Black Shoe Carrier Admiral" unearthed new information about the situation that goes a long way to justify Fletcher's actions. I think Adams was unduly influenced against Fletcher by his (out-of-date) sources and it seemed to me that the chapter was much more focused on attacking Fletcher than providing unbiased judgement on his actions. Hindsight also comes into play here; as the author trusts completely the radio intelligence regarding locations of Japanese carriers - something Fletcher couldn't afford to do.3) This book is too long. Mainly because the author repeats himself and his arguments multiple times. Several times I caught myself feeling deja vu and wondering if I'd flipped the pages backwards somehow.Ok; that's most of the negative. As for the positive; this book has a great premise: analyze naval strategy by the USN and IJN since both looked to the same man's ideas (Mahan) as part of their doctrine. Adams goes on to highlight certain admirals as being great strategists while others are found lacking; and he shows that several of the Pacific invasions of WWII were completely unnecessary. I also enjoyed the chapters on submarines and strategic bombing at the end; they were good additions to fully flesh out the concepts of Mahan in a new technological era. Furthermore the comments on Japanese strategy in the early chapters were fantastic; the recommendation to invade part of Hawaii; interdict the Guadalcanal - Espiritu Santo shipping lanes; etc. were all enlightening and make for a fascinating "what-if" scenario: if the Japanese had better strategic leadership in 1941-1942 that was willing to take more risks to hit the US Navy harder; what might the war have looked like?To conclude: this is a good book that I am glad I got; but it needs more work to be a great book.40 of 40 people found the following review helpful. Good analysis; slightly flawed by overuse of hindsightBy Tony ZbaraschukThere are many books telling what happened in individual battles or to particular ships. This book tries to grade the thinking of those who determined where forces went into battle and why.Mostly it succeeds at describing the strategic goals and thinking (or lack thereof!) of the admirals in charge of the Pacific War on both sides. Yamamoto gets failing grades for not ensuring that his brilliant and risky gambles were sufficiently followed through; King gets consistently fairly high grades; a number of characters on both sides are criticized for various flaws.One flaw in this book is the over-use of hindsight; the author judges various strategic ideas as if everyone should have understood at the time things that did not become clear until much later; for instance; the total dominance of the aircraft carrier over the battleship; or the inability of high-altitude bombers to hit anything in motion. He several times criticizes admirals for not understanding that their cherished goal should only have been the means to an end (e.g.; Ugaki's desire to take Guadalcanal) but does not realize that his somewhat repetitive chanting of "Never divide the fleet" or "Sink the carriers" are both ends toward maintaining control of the sea. (He probably should at least have looked at some of Sir Julian Corbett's criticisms of Mahan's work.)That said; there are many excellent gems of observation; and quite a lot of good analysis; in the book. To experienced naval strategists; they will come as no surprise; to the vast majority of the human race and Pacific War buffs who are not; this will be a very useful learning course. Readers will probably want some previous acquaintance with the history of World War II in the Pacific; but given such acquaintance this is a challenging and rewarding analysis.Highly recommended.1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. interesting readBy historyreaderThere are several detailed reviews already; so I'll get to my main points:1. I think it could have used better editing: it's a bit slow getting started; there is some repetition; and his "Mahan would have approved" (and variations thereof) gets irritating. 2. While the author does slip a bit into hindsight; most of his analysis is based on strategy. For example Adams disapproves of the invasions of Tarawa and Iwo Jima not because they were not worth the cost (hindsight) but because they were not necessary: The mobility of the US fleet made invading Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands needless (go straight to the Marianas). Okinawa would have been just as good a B-29 emergency field and was strategically important for other reasons; too; go to Okinawa; skip Iwo Jima. Agree with him or not; he made me think.
