Now fully updated and revised; this clear and comprehensive text explores the past quarter-century of Soviet/Russian international relations; comparing foreign policy formation under Gorbachev; Yeltsin; Putin; and Medvedev. Challenging conventional views of Moscow’s foreign policy; Andrei P. Tsygankov shows that definitions of national interest depend on visions of national identity and is rooted both in history and domestic politics. Yet the author also highlights the role of the external environment in affecting the balance of power among competing domestic groups. Drawing on both Russian and Western sources; Tsygankov shows how Moscow’s policies have shifted under different leaders’ visions of Russia’s national interests. He gives an overview of the ideas and pressures that motivated Russian foreign policy in six different periods: the Gorbachev era of the late 1980s; the liberal “Westernizers†era under Kozyrev in the early 1990s; the relatively hardline statist policy under Primakov; the more pragmatic statist course under Putin; the assertive policy of the late Putin era; and the return to pragmatic cooperation under Medvedev. Evaluating the successes and failures of Russia’s foreign policies; Tsygankov explains its many turns as Russia’s identity and interaction with the West have evolved. The book concludes with reflections on the emergence of the post-Western world and the challenges it presents to Russia’s enduring quest for great-power status along with its desire for a special relationship with Western nations.
#1156171 in Books 2016-01-11Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.21 x .56 x 6.14l; .0 #File Name: 1440803250216 pages
Review
3 of 3 people found the following review helpful. This is useful reading for anyone interested in the Civil War or the history of US agriculture. Short; but thought-provoking.By lyndonbrechtThis will be an excellent book for the interested reader; but be aware what it is and is not. It is not a history of agriculture and it is not a study of agricultural policy during wartime. It is not an economic history and it offers little in the way of stories of individuals. It fits the series description quite well; it's more of a general comparison of the Union and the Confederacy in agricultural matters during each of the war years. It includes a fair amount of data. The writing is excellent throughout. There are a few photos; but one is stunning: a farmyard scene somewhere in the South; showing many dead horses and mules; killed by Union soldiers to deny them to Confederate use (a common pattern later in the war).Also there is an important factor in Southern states' delegations to Congress being absent. During the war years the Lincoln administration passed the Homestead Act; created the Department of Agriculture and the land grant college program; none of which would likely have passed a Congress dominated by Southern conservatism. The land grant universities include many of today's great state universities.Here are some of the points the book makes; which I found cause for thought.--On the eve of the war slightly more than half the nation's 31.4 million people lived on farms (that figure includes about 4 million slaves).--Horses in the Union army required 10 pounds of hay and 14 pounds of grain; per day. In the course of the war; Union forces purchased 640;000 horses at a cost of $95 million (convert to current money values; that's a lot!). Horses in the Confederate forces got less and less fodder as the war went on; weakening Confederate cavalry and transport.--Financial policy was important; in the Union the many state banks issued more than 5;000 kinds of paper money; widely distrusted; and when the Union came out with paper money backed by the government; farmers' trust went up (even though the money was discounted somewhat against hard currency). Confederate economic policy in general was not very effective and the Confederacy experienced hyperinflation; the government in effect required a tithe of farm produce that was widely resented.--A huge portion of the agricultural work force was diverted to military service. Among other things; this drove the cost of labor up and resulted in a quite large number of women working in the fields in the North; and some even in the South.--The demands of the military drove up prices for fodder; meat animals; wheat; wool; and about everything else--in the North. Confederate farmers got higher prices but had much more difficulty with transporting produce; with military seizures and the fact most of the fighting was in the South.--The scarcity of labor facilitated mechanization; more in terms of increased purchasing of existing machinery than driving innovation.--Pre-war distribution was disrupted. Farm products from the Midwest before the war went down the Mississippi to feed Southerners and for export; but this diverted to rail and the Great Lakes/ St Lawrence and the canal systems; creating intense development of Chicago as a center. The North's blockade became more and more effective as the war went on; depriving the Confederacy of the cotton trade; and sharply limiting imports.--Food became more and more scarce; so much so as to provoke food riots in several Southern cities; some of them led by women.The last two chapters muse on the era after the war. For Northern farmers; prices went down and wartime prosperity vanished. For Southerners; the slave-based part of agriculture collapsed (even though in some areas it converted to an allegedly free system better described as serfdom); and millions of former slaves were freed--and did gain some economic and political power; even if sharply limited by later events. The footprint of the Civil War in the South's agriculture; says the author; lasted well into the 20th century; so widespread was the destruction and disruption.
