Taking as its subject the first fifty years of the eighteenth century and following the arrangement of the two earlier works in this distinguished series ; the third volume of The Complete Book of Emigrants provides a comprehensive list of emigrants from surviving records in English archives. The records used in this volume; in addition to the usual spread of sources; derive principally from (1) Plantation Apprenticeship Bindins; (2) Port Books; and (3) Convict Pardons on Condition of Transportation. Again; as with the other volumes; there are indexes of names and ships. Altogether some 25;000 emigrants are identified; bringing the total names in the three volumes to over 75;000.
#699626 in Books Michael R Matheny 2012-06-16 2011-04-01Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.00 x .85 x 6.00l; 1.20 #File Name: 080614324X360 pagesCarrying the War to the Enemy
Review
2 of 2 people found the following review helpful. Nuts and bolts on thinkingBy Thomas E. JohhnsonThe work covers the development of Operational level thinking and planning in the US military; showing that it has a long history (back to the Civil War); but concentrating on the interwar and World War II periods in detail. I would regard int as essential reading for anyone who seriously studies American planning and operations for that period.4 of 4 people found the following review helpful. timely historyBy david l. porembaThis is a history of the "operational art" as it developed in the United States Army from the early 1880's to the end of the Second World War in 1945. Operational art; when used effectively by commanders; turns tactics into strategic victory. It is generally agreed that modern operational art developed during the interwar years (1919-1939); in Germany and the Soviet Union; not in the United States whose emasculation of its armed services when peace arrives is well known.What is not so well known or studied is the role played by the army and navy educational systems after graduation form the academies. In 1881; General William T. Sherman ordered the establishment of the School of Application for Cavalry and Infantry at Fort Leavenworth; Kansas. By 1907; this school had expended into the School of the Line and the Army Staff College. The Army War College; at the top of the system; opened in 1904. The US Navy opened its War College in Newport; Rhode Island in 1904 as well.Matheny discusses how officers and instructors at these colleges studied and interpreted the American experience in World War I. Their thoughts on joint and combined operations would lead to success in World War II. Matheny cites four major examples of successful combined operations: the invasion of North Africa; 1942; Operation Torch; Overlord; the invasion of Normandy; 1944; General Douglas MacArthur's return to the Philippines in 1944; and; Operation Iceberg; the 1945 invasion of Okinawa. These successful ops put the US on the same level of efficiency as the Germans.The author goes on to say that the beginning of nuclear warfare led the US to ignore operational studies; much to its detriment in Vietnam.This is a timely; well-written book with a huge relevance on today's battlefield.1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Highly Recommended; Mostly Concerns Amphibious WarfareBy John HamillThis is an excellent; well written; and one of a kind book on an unusual topic. Although it has been said that the US military neglected operational thought prior to and during World War II; the author instead shows that they excelled at joint operations; particularly amphibious warfare. He shows how the US developed war colleges where theory was developed; scenarios were wargamed; and the services learned to cooperate effectively. This cooperation was unique in the world at the time and was developed to suit America's unique position of "carrying the war to the enemy" - in places far from home. As a result; logistics were stressed in the US military much more so than in other nations. The author points out; for example; that German army staff organization stressed operational planning over logistics; which resulted in good battlefield performance that was often counteracted by disappointing and unexpected supply difficulties.The flaws in the book are few - and mainly ones of omission. The type of operational thought like that found in Germany and the Soviet Union - that of large armies on a large land mass - is covered only in passing. The author does mention the US Army's belief that wide flanking movements were necessary because of mechanization - but he does not discuss the validity of this line of thinking; why it was developed; or its implications. Could this line of thinking be related to the US Army's unwillingness to mass tanks like the Germans or give tanks heavier armor and bigger guns? Also; the author does not attempt to explain how an army so focused on logistics failed so miserably to continue its advance into Germany in the fall of 1944. Perhaps the concept of "phasing" that he discusses was a limitation mentally - or perhaps it was simply a failure to appreciate just how quick mobile warfare could become. Overall; the book presents a rosy view of the US military of the time and a rosy view of the military and naval schools prepared the commanders in World War II for the unprecedented war that they fought. In other respects not discussed; a rosy view is NOT justified in my mind.Overall; this book is excellent and will give you a new and refreshing view that you will not find elsewhere. I highly recommend it.
