The formation of the Confederate States of America involved more than an attempt to create a new; sovereign nation -- it inspired a flurry of creativity and entrepreneurialism in the South that fiercely matched Union ingenuity. H. Jackson Knight's Confederate Invention brings to light the forgotten history of the Confederacy's industrious inventors and its active patent office.Despite the destruction wrought by the Civil War; evidence of Confederate inventions exists in the registry of the Confederate States Patent Office. Hundreds of southerners submitted applications to the agency to secure patents on their intellectual property; which ranged from a "machine for operating submarine batteries;" to a "steam plough;" to a "combined knapsack and tent;" to an "instrument for sighting cannon." The Confederacy's most successful inventors included entrepreneurs; educators; and military men who sought to develop new weapons; weapon improvements; or other inventions that could benefit the Confederate cause as well as their own lives. Each creation belied the conception of a technologically backward South; incapable of matching the creativity and output of northern counterparts. Knight's work provides a groundbreaking study that includes neglected and largely forgotten patents as well as an array of other primary sources. Details on the patent office's origins; inner workings; and demise; and accounts of southern inventors who obtained patents before; during; and after the war reveal a captivating history recovered from obscurity.A novel creation in its own right; Confederate Invention presents the remarkable story behind the South's long-forgotten Civil War inventors and offers a comprehensive account of Confederate patents.
#1254690 in Books Louisiana State University Press 2005-12-01 2005-12-01Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.22 x 1.17 x 6.40l; 1.36 #File Name: 0807130885336 pages
Review
6 of 6 people found the following review helpful. Excellent Treatment of The Least Significant Confederate TheaterBy David M. DoughertyThe author has written a fine book on Trans-Mississippi Theater during the last half of the Civil War. Although the prose is excellent; this is not a book for a beginner -- the reader needs a substantial amount of knowledge of the Civil War and particularly the actions from Wilson's Creek to Prairie Grove and of the problems facing the Confederates in Missouri; Arkansas; Louisiana and Texas. After Vicksburg the area west of the Mississippi was essentially cut off from the remainder of the Confederacy; and to a large sense; could have been occupied fully by federal troops after that time without affecting or advancing the outcome of the war. Given that the West was not important; except to isolate and draw off confederate resources; the conflicts between Kirby Smith and Taylor's successes in the Red River campaign are only marginally interesting except to the most serious Civil War historians and descendants of those residing in the four states during the war. That being said; this work advances the understanding of the conflict by drawing attention to the type of interpersonal squabbling between general officers that so characterized the armies and command structures on both sides and in all theaters. In the Confederacy the conflicts between Johnston and Davis; Longstreet and Bragg; (Bragg and about everyone); Hood and Johnston; and others below Army level often negatively affected confederate army performance. On the Federal side there were many more simply because there were more generals; and it must be remembered that both sides were made up of similar stock and trained in the same schools and pre-war service. I noticed that one reviewer called both generals (Smith and Taylor) flawed; but the war produced no perfect generals at the army level; not even Lee. (My favorite general is Pat Cleburne; but even he had difficulties with some of his superiors.) Here we have Richard Taylor; a commander who learned his trade under Stonewall Jackson; and Kirby Smith who actually saw little direct action during the war and was thrust into a high command position through a series of fortunate (for him) circumstances. Of the two; Taylor was much more aggressive; but Smith had more responsibility and his attention was diffused on a greater number of issues. Taylor absolutely was insubordinate to Smith and could easily have been relieved; but victories can outweigh a number of sins. Nonetheless; the author is careful to point out that Taylor's victory at Mansfield (Pleasant Hill) and subsequent operations were not the total defeat of Banks as often depicted; and not all of the reasons Taylor was not more successful were due to Kirby Smith. I thought the author was as even-handed as possible in his presentation; and for that he is to be commended. There were also failures by Taylor's subordinates and by Taylor himself; as well as solid work by some federal officers below Banks. Nonetheless; Smith and Taylor probably did about as well as could be expected in any case; and their troops were never able to be made available to confederate armies in the decisive theaters. Even if Taylor had been able to destroy all of Banks's army; the effect on the outcome of the war would have been negligible. And it must be remembered; there was never a case in the war where an army of over 5;000 men was destroyed by the opposing force in the field (only in sieges: Donelson; Vicksburg; and Harpers Ferry and the final capitulations.) In short; I very much liked this book; the scholarship by the author; and his handling of the main characters. Perhaps there could have been more information concerning the federal forces engaged; but after all; this work was focused on the confederate command structure; and the relationship between Kirby Smith and Richard Taylor. What was done was done well; and I recommend this book unreservedly to Civil War readers.0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. TWO SUPER EGOS ON A COLLISION COURSEBy alan shawGreat reading of the battle behind the scenes over how and with whom the battle was to be fought. Two super egos on a collision course. Kirby had the rank; Taylor had the brains. A dynamic story of wills.6 of 6 people found the following review helpful. Command Confrontation in the Trans-MississippiBy E. E PofahlCompared to Civil War operations in Northern Virginia; comparatively little has been published regarding operations west of the Mississippi River. In this work; the author Jeffery Prushankin provides a comprehensive overview of the events in the Trans-Mississippi area as viewed by Department Commander General Edmund Kirby Smith and by his subordinate General Richard Taylor. The text offers an informative account of the antagonistic relationship between these two generals and the consequent military results.The text opens with a brief narrative of the backgrounds of the two generals. Taylor received a political commission as a colonel of the Ninth Louisiana Infantry. He was promoted to brigadier general and briefly served under General Stonewall Jackson. Under Jackson; Taylor adopted Jackson's philosophy that "The value of the initiative in war cannot be overstated" resulting in the tactical strategy that the best defense is a good offense. Kirby-Smith graduated from West Point in 1845 and served in the war in Mexico. In May 1861; he received an appointment as chief of staff to General Joseph F. Johnson. He learned from Johnson and adopted Johnson's tactical and strategic philosophies. The opposing tactical/strategic philosophies of Smith and Taylor; was one of the items contributing to the many confrontations between Smith and Taylor.As a brigadier general Smith was sent to command the Department of East Tennessee where he promptly repeated the mistake of his predecessor by concentrating on Arkansas."His propensity to favor the defensive often led to sluggish or ill-timed concentration that made his strategy ineffective." Taylor assigned to Louisiana; by October 1862 was operating as an independent command thereby setting the stage for confrontations.The text narrates how in 1863 with the mounting threat to Vicksburg and reduced Federal threat in central Louisiana; Smith chose a politically expedient path and ordered Taylor to strike the Federals west of the Mississippi. Their consequent failures along the Mississippi subsequently reflected badly on both Smith and Taylor and only added to the burgeoning dispute between Smith and Taylor. By mid-1863 Smith was not providing the type of leadership required in the Trans-Mississippi. Smith's failure to support Taylor lead to serious problems for the Confederates in 1864 and also resulted in additional serious problems between the generals.The text provides a brief account of the Red River campaign which Taylor executed receiving inconsistent support from Smith. Disobeying orders; on April 8; 1864; Taylor attached the Federal Army under General Banks at Mansfield; Louisiana; stopping the Federal advance. The next day Taylor fought and defeated Banks at Pleasant Hill after which the Federals began to retreat pursued by Taylor. Meanwhile; Smith following his Arkansas strategy didn't support Taylor and withdrew infantry and cavalry from Taylor for Smith's pursuit of Union General Steele back to Little Rock. Taylor pursued General Banks to Alexandria; but lacked the necessary manpower to defeat Banks; Banks ultimately escaped. Smith's campaign against Union General Steele resulted in victory at the battle of Jenkins' Ferry; but it did not "enhance the condition of the Confederacy in the Trans-Mississippi." The dispute between Smith and Taylor became quite bitter with Taylor blaming Smith for the escape of General Banks and the Federal Fleet under Admiral Porter.Taylor asked to be relieved from command. Smith removed Taylor from command on June 10; 1864. Amazingly; on July 18 Taylor was promoted to lieutenant general and was reassigned as commander of the Department of Alabama; Mississippi and East Louisiana. The author gives a short narration of Taylor's effort to cross the Mississippi and assume his new command together with a brief summary of his and Smith's activities to the end of the war. Smith surrendered in Galveston on June 2; 1865 while Taylor had surrendered May 6; 1865 at Citronelle; Alabama. After surrendering Taylor went to Washington to lobby for the release of Jefferson Davis after which he worked as a lobbyist for the Democratic Party and as an outspoken critic of the Ku Klux Klan. Smith traveled first to Mexico City where he was unwelcome; then traveled to Cuba eventually returning home. In 1879 Taylor published his memoir titled Destruction and Reconstruction which helped nurture the Lost Cause myth. In his memoir Taylor described Smith's policy as one of "sheer stupidity and pig-headed obstinacy...." His memoirs were relied on by countless former Confederates "for their own reminiscences of the war."Despite their acrimonious relationship; Smith and Taylor produced a great Confederate military accomplishment in the Red River campaign against a superior Union force. Unfortunately; Smith's cavalry raid on St. Louis resulted in little of military value.The reader of this book will find it a source of much information on an often neglected area of operations. It gives fascinating portraits of opposing strategies and personalities. With the Red River campaign a great Confederate accomplishment; one can only speculate on what would have been accomplished if Taylor and Smith had worked harmoniously together.
